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Abstract
This dissertation is a collection of three independent empirical essays on development economics, with
applications to public service reform, policy evaluation, and community-driven development in Bolivia.
The first chapter investigates the potential of information technologies to improve public service delivery
and empower citizens in the context of two unusual randomized natural experiments occurring within one
particular bureaucratic process: the renewal of a national identification card by the Bolivian Police. The
first experiment arises from the random assignment of both police officers and applicants to a manual or
digital renewal process, which is identical in all aspects except that the digital renewal process makes use of
information technologies as part of the renewal process. The second experiment arises by the existence of
technical failures within the digital renewal process, which allows police officers to change from the digital to
the manual renewal process randomly across renewal day. The efficiency of public service delivery is measured
in terms of both renewal success rates (which average to a strikingly low rate of 72 percent in my sample) and
time-it-takes to renew an identification card. The causal effect of information technologies on public service
delivery is estimated using two different identification strategies. In the first one, applicant-police officer
pairs randomly assigned to each one of these two renewal processes are compared after controlling for renewal
day fixed effects. In the second one, applicant-police officer pairs randomly assigned to the digital process are
compared to those randomly assigned to this same process but who experienced a technical failure within the
process, which allows to directly control for unobserved heterogeneity at the police officer level. I find that
information technologies significantly improve the quality of public service delivery. Applicants randomly
assigned to the digital renewal process are on average 12 percentage points more likely to complete the renewal
process as compared to those randomly assigned to the manual one. Further, successful applicants randomly
assigned to the digital process take on average 31 percent less time to complete the process as compared
to those randomly assigned to the manual one. Lastly, I find that information technologies significantly
lower barriers in access to national identification cards by promoting a more equitable provision across
the population. I discuss several channels through which technologies might be improving efficiency and
promoting equity within this particular bureaucratic process. Overall, my findings suggest that information
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technologies might be achieving these goals by introducing efficiencies (such as reducing administrative
shortcomings and transaction costs), and limiting the exercise of discretion by police officers within the
renewal process.
The second chapter considers the extent to which cash transfer programs might affect child labor and
schooling decisions by the households when families are fully unconstrained in the use of the benefits from
these programs. This is investigated in the context of a policy quasi-experiment created by the introduction
of a large old-age pension program in Bolivia, the Bolivida, which does not target specific behavioral changes,
and it is paid to all elder citizens independent of their income levels. To identify the causal effects of this
program, I use two alternative identification strategies. In the first one, I estimate average intent-to-treat
effects of the program under a fuzzy regression discontinuity approach by taking advantage of the fact that
the probability of receiving the pension changes discontinuously at the eligibility age. In the second one, I
estimate average treatment effects on the treated by using eligibility as an instrumental variable for Bolivida
receipt. My findings present some evidence that the Bolivida led to a substantial increase in the probability
that children in the rural areas from households with relatively low levels of assets were engaged in child
labor (5.53 percentage points). In contrast, the Bolivida led to a substantial reduction in the probability that
children in the urban areas from households with relatively low levels of assets were engaged in child labor
(-32.97 percentage points), and in the number of hours urban children from households with relatively low
levels of assets spend in farming and agricultural activities (-146.45 percent reduction in hours worked). The
changes in child labor as a result of the Bolivida, however, did not translate into changes in school attendance
among children. I discuss several reasons why the Bolivida might affect children’s time allocation decisions,
including the possibility that households engage in bargaining behavior, that households might be myopic
when making decisions regarding their children’s human capital investments, and that households might
be credit or liquidity constrained. Overall, my findings are most consistent with the existence of credit
and liquidity constraints among poor rural households. In particular, unconditional cash transfer programs
might create incentives for liquidity and credit constrained agricultural households to engage their children in
farming activities by facilitating productive investments in settings where labor markets are missing, where
hired labor cannot easily be substituted for family labor due to moral hazard problems, and where returns
to experience from child labor are high.
The third chapter examines bureaucratic delay within the allocation of small infrastructure projects by
municipal governments in Bolivia, and it presents a randomized field experiment designed to improve public
service delivery by promoting voice, transparency, and accountability among grassroots organizations. The
experiment consists of randomly providing municipal governments with a mailing tracking system, which
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provides public officials and grassroots organizations real-time information about the processing of small
infrastructure projects requests by municipal governments. The objective of this intervention is twofold.
First, is to facilitate the involvement of grassroots organizations in the process of reviewing, tracking, and
monitoring small infrastructure project allocations. Second, is to explicitly alter the probability of detecting
inefficient administrative practices within district councils and, therefore, to implicitly increase the expected
cost of engaging in such practices among public officials. The findings of this paper suggest that monitoring
tools that promote access to information by citizens might play a critical role in improving public service
delivery outcomes. Yet, in settings where mechanisms of local accountability are subject to be captured by
local elites or are weak, monitoring tools might have limited capacity to improve outcomes. In such settings,
major transparency related reforms might be needed to improve public service delivery outcomes.
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Chapter 1
Information technologies and
provision of national identification
cards by the Bolivian Police:
Evidence from two randomized
natural field experiments
Introduction
Shortcomings in identification documents and, more generally, lack of identification documents are pervasive
and widespread problems in most of the developing world. In general, the poor are at higher risk of
holding invalid identification documents and, therefore, of being denied access to basic social services and
marginalized. In many developing countries, identification cards are an essential document to hold a job
in the formal sector, own property, receive basic social services, benefit from social transfers, carry out
bank transactions, vote in elections and, more generally, to fully participate in society (Duryea, Olgiati,
and Stone, 2006). Still, getting an identification card in many of these countries is a complicated process,
which is generally associated with excessive bureaucracy, red tape, and corruption. Moreover, bureaucracy is
intimidating to many people, especially so to the poor and those belonging to groups traditionally excluded
from the mainstream. To this end, understanding how to lower barriers in access to identification cards is
vital to promote more equitable access to public services by citizens.
Over the past decade, access to information technologies in developing countries has grown rapidly. In-
creased access to these technologies has unleashed the potential to use of them to advance development
objectives and promote greater equality (Sunden and Wicander, 2006). Applications of information tech-
nologies to address development challenges have multiplied in recent years. Some examples include the use
of information technologies to access price information for market participants in Peru, access to financial
services through mobile banking in Kenya, and rapid damage assessment following natural disasters like the
earthquake in Haiti (World Bank, 2011). However, the use of information technologies as a means to improve
the quality and reach of government services has lagged behind in comparison. Information technologies
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significantly affect the way in which citizens and governments interact, and whether they might be effective
at enhancing economic opportunities for the poor, improving delivery of services to the under-served, and
enhancing government efficiency and transparency is an important and open empirical question.
Although the development community is increasingly supporting public service reforms linked to infor-
mation technologies, there is little evidence about the potential of these technologies for dealing with some of
the challenges to public service reform in developing countries.1 Information technologies might affect gov-
ernance and public service delivery outcomes through different channels, including efficiency, effectiveness,
transparency, and increased access (World Bank, 2011). Yet, the benefits arising from the use of information
technologies and its mechanisms have been notoriously difficult to measure (e.g. Bresnahan and Gordon
(1997), and Griliches (1998)). Most of the previous literature has looked at aggregated data or firm-level
data and has looked at the effects of investments in information technologies on labor productivity measures
or total factor productivity (e.g. Schreyer (2000), Colecchia and Schreyer (2001), and Stiroh (2001)). Some
other studies have relied instead on growth accounting techniques, estimating the basic neoclassical produc-
tion function, including information technologies as one of the production factors (e.g. Draca, Sadun, and
Reenen, 2006).
This paper investigates the potential of information technologies to improve public service delivery and
empower citizens in the context of two unusual randomized natural experiments occurring within one par-
ticular bureaucratic process: the renewal of a national identification card by the Bolivian Police (ID cards
from now on).2 The first natural experiment arises from the random assignment of both police officers and
applicants to a manual or digital renewal process, which is identical in all aspects except that the digital
process makes use of information technologies as part of the renewal process that introduce efficiencies within
the process. The second experiment arises by the existence of technical failures within the digital renewal
process, which allow for police officers to randomly change from the digital to the manual process across
renewal day. The causal effect of information technologies on ID card provision is identified by using two
different identification strategies. In the first one, I compare applicant-police officer pairs randomly assigned
to each of these two renewal processes after controlling for day-of-renewal fixed effects. In the second one,
I take advantage of the prevalence of technical failures, and compare instead applicant-police officers pairs
randomly assigned to the digital or manual process after controlling for police officer fixed effects. The
quality of public service delivery within this bureaucratic process is measured in terms of success rates at
1For instance, the World Bank has just released an entire report devoted to the idea of achieving development results through
information technologies applications (World Bank, 2011). The flagship publication of the Inter-American Development Bank,
this year, is also entirely devoted to the idea of incorporating information technologies as a tool to advance development
objectives (Inter-American Development Bank, 2011).
2National identification cards are analogous to Social Security numbers in the US.
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completing the renewal process and time it takes to complete the process conditional on being successful.
The results of this paper present strong evidence that the adoption of information technologies by the
Police led to substantial improvements in the quality of service provided to citizens. Applicants randomly
assigned to a digital renewal process are, on average, 12 percentage points more likely to complete the renewal
process as compared to those randomly assigned to the manual process. Further, applicants who are able to
complete the renewal process and who are randomly assigned to the digital process, take on average 31 percent
less time to complete the renewal process as compared to the average time taken by those applicants who
are able to complete the renewal process and who are randomly assigned to the manual process. Information
technologies seem to be translating into an improvement in overall quality within this bureaucratic process by
increasing efficiencies within the renewal process, including a reduction in transaction costs and an increase
in accountability to citizens. More importantly, I find strong evidence that the characteristics of applicants
are important predictors of the probability of successfully completing a renewal process, and the time it
takes to complete it conditional on being successful. Applicants from rural areas, indigenous groups, with
lower levels of education, and from lower socioeconomic strata all have lower success rates as compared to
those from relatively better-off backgrounds. To the extent that I just look at ID card renewals instead of
new applications, my findings are hard to reconcile with the existence of heterogeneous paperwork quality
among applicants. In addition and interestingly, I find robust evidence that information technologies within
this bureaucratic process are significantly lowering barriers in access to ID cards among applicants from
relatively disadvantaged backgrounds and, thus, serve as effective tools at promoting equitable public service
delivery within this bureaucratic process. Overall, my findings are consistent with the existence of selective
enforcement of rules and disparities in service quality by police officers based on applicants characteristics,
and the possibility that red tape might affect applicants differently based on their intrinsic characteristics.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses the setting of the study. Section 3
describes the two natural experiments in this setting. Section 4 presents the estimation framework. Section
5 describes the data. Section 6 presents the experimental results. Section 7 discusses the results of the study.
Section 8 concludes.
Setting of the study
In Article 27, the Organic Law of the Bolivian Police of 1985 stipulates that the Police is the entity in
charge of the provision of ID cards to citizens. At the local level, the Identification Units are the bodies
responsible for administering this act. In La Paz, the city where this study takes place, ID cards are issued
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at two Identification Units. Each of these Units is located at two distant points in the city: one is in the
downtown area and one in the rich south zone. However, the jurisdiction of each office does not coincide
with the neighborhood of residence, and individuals can obtain their ID cards in any of these two offices.
The downtown Identification Unit is by far the largest in the city. At the time of this study, it was issuing
roughly 95 percent of the total number of ID cards per day in the city — approximately 1,200 cards per day.
To renew a national ID card, an individual needs to bring a proof of identity to the Identification Unit,
and pay an application fee of BS 17 (USD 2.5). Acceptable documents as proof of identity include expired
ID card, birth certificate, current (i.e. not expired) driving license, military ID card, passport, school ID
card, or electoral list fraud prevention card. Upon presentation of a valid proof of identity, the applicant
gets randomly assigned to a renewal table at the Unit. In the downtown Identification Unit, the setting for
this study, there are 41 renewal tables, each of whom has a police officer permanently assigned to it. As soon
as the applicant gets to his renewal table, he needs to hand over his proof of identity and the token with
the renewal table number assigned to. The police officer assigned to the table then needs to locate the vital
records of the applicant, which are kept at a Vital Records Archive maintained by the Police located at the
basement of the building and only accessible to police officers. Once the vital records of the applicant have
been located, the last name of the applicant is called and the applicant needs then to go through a series
of steps to complete the renewal process. These renewal steps include paying for the application fee at a
Financial Services and Cashier Operations office, getting a photograph taken, fingerprinting and, if needed,
getting marital status, occupation, and residence updated. Upon completion of all these steps, the ID card
renewal process is considered completed and the card is sent for lamination. The individual then can pick
up the ID card within 24 hours from the Identification Unit.
The simple administrative steps required to complete the renewal process are, in practice, a lengthy
process. Renewing a national ID card in Bolivia has long been associated with red tape, bureaucratic
delay, corruption, and the provision of different service quality by police officers to applicants based on their
characteristics (e.g. World Bank (2000), Mansilla (2003), Quintana (2003), and Wanderley (2007)). Further,
administrative shortcomings are pervasive within this process. For instance, vital records are often reported
as missing.3 The Identification Unit has a poor archiving system, which is based only on the last name of the
applicant, and therefore results in many missing vital records. To the extent that the Unit holds more than 1
million records in its archives, and that these are all stacked in a small basement, vital records are often lost.
Yet, what it is not clear is the extent to which the issue of missing vital records affects applicants randomly or
is the result of a shortcoming incurred by police officers systematically. Another practice, which is believed
3Other reasons why the applicants might not be able to complete the renewal process include misspelling of names (due to
typing mistakes incurred by the police officers), duplicity of cards, and long waiting times.
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to be quite common among police officers, is the provision of different service quality to applicants based
on their observable characteristics. Police officers might not be very helpful with applicants from relatively
disadvantaged backgrounds or might not call their names on a first-come first-served basis but rather at
their own discretion. In practice, the prevalence of administrative shortcomings, and more generally the
possibility of exercising discretion at completing some of the renewal steps, often leads to police officers
being willing to accept, or implicitly asking for, extra-legal payments in order to bend some of the rules and
expedite the process (PNUD, 2006).4 All the red tape present within this process is further exacerbated
by the lack of information on the steps that should be followed to renew an ID card, the overcrowding of
applicants, and the poor signage at the Identification Unit.
Two unique natural experiments
Since 2006, the Police started a large effort to digitize vital records of citizens across the country. This
effort was aimed both at improving the provision of ID cards to citizens and curbing electoral fraud and
corruption. By the time this study took place, vital records of all citizens in the city of La Paz had been
digitized, and put into a vital records dataset. This newly created dataset called for a full transformation of
the renewal process. As part of this transformation process, the Identification Unit introduced a new digital
renewal process, which consisted of accessing the vital records of the applicants online using a computer,
filling the applicants’ information online, getting the photograph taken using a digital camera connected to
that computer, and getting the ID card printed out in a laser printer. That is, the digital process allowed
for all of the renewal steps to be performed at the renewal table, except for the payment of the application
fee. This was in sharp contrast to the old manual renewal process, which required the applicant to get his
photograph taken out at a different building and pick-up his photograph at a developing film office, which
was also located at a different building within the Unit. At the end of the day, however, ID cards issued
under the manual and digital process were identical except for the fact that the digital ones were issued
following the digital renewal process.
For a short period of time, the downtown Identification Unit in the city of La Paz was simultaneously
following both the manual and digital renewal process. This existence of this dual renewal system was the
result of budget constraints, which did not allow the Police to introduce these technologies in all of the
41 renewal tables at the Unit simultaneously. To avoid complaints, the Police decided to randomly assign
both police officers and applicants to each one of these two renewal processes. On the one hand, police
4Extra-legal payments are usually in the order of 2 to 10 USD per ID card. This is a significant amount in Bolivia considering
that the minimum monthly wage is around 92 USD, and that the median monthly wage is around 363 USD (UDAPE, 2009).
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officers were randomly assigned to either one of the processes by lottery at the beginning of the transition
period and remained at the same table throughout their time at the Identification Unit. On the other hand,
applicants were randomly assigned to each one of these two processes by the following a simple sequential
rule. Upon presentation of the valid document as proof of identity, the applicant was sequentially assigned
to one of the 41 renewal tables located across the Identification Unit — 23 of them issuing manual cards
and 18 of them issuing digital ones. As the type of renewal was randomly allocated across police officers,
the numerical correspondence of tables was completely unrelated to the type of process followed in each
renewal table. Moreover, to assure that applicants did not try to change their randomly assigned renewal
table number, applicants thumbnails were marked at the randomization table with election ink. This simple
device, strictly enforced in practice, prevented applicants from starting a new renewal process within the
same day (or couple of days until the ink had faded away) if they were not assigned to their preferred type
of renewal process.
A unique feature of this study is the existence of technical failures. Technical failures affect only tables
that follow a digital renewal process and occur frequently. In this setting, technical failures refer to lack of
printer consumables or temporarily out-of-order computers. Roughly 19 percent of the digital tables report
at least one technical failure each week. Because of the administrative procedures followed by the Police,
technical failures could not be addressed the same day. So, if a computer broke down for example, it would
be down for the rest of the day. Also, if a printer would ran out of toner, it would only be replaced at the
end of the day. This introduced a second natural experiment in this setting. In particular, to avoid delays
and overcrowding of applicants, the Police decided to allow all digital tables to continue issuing manual
cards when a technical failure suddenly arose. In practice, this boiled down to allowing them to keep the
old typewriter they were using during the manual system, and instructing them to switch immediately to
the manual process if a technical failure arose.
Although applicants and police officers were assigned to the digital renewal process randomly as described
above, it is useful to examine whether the digital renewal process is ex-post correlated with some police
officer and applicant characteristics of interest. Table 1.1 explores this by reporting marginal effects of
probit regressions for the probability of being randomized into the digital process as a function of 5 police
officers, and 6 applicant characteristics. As expected, given the randomization, the magnitudes of these
marginal effects are small and not jointly-significant predictors of the probability of being assigned into a
digital renewal process at standard levels (joint p-values 0.17, 0.12, 0.18, 0.11, and 0.10 depending on the
specification). This is reassuring and suggests that the administrative procedures put in place by the Police
at the Identification Unit were closely followed and enforced in practice — at least along the observable
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dimensions. However, as several of these covariates (police officer tenure, police office rank, male applicant
rural status, and female applicant education level) are individually significant at the 5 and 10 percent levels,
I estimate the main experimental results including these covariates. The main results of the paper, however,
remain largely unchanged when adding these covariates as control variables.
Estimation framework
The causal effect of information technologies, over traditional technologies, on the provision of ID cards for
citizens can be estimated using the following regression model for applicant i assigned to police officer j ’s
renewal table on day t :
yijt = α+ βdigitalij + ωt + ξijt (1.1)
where y is either: (i) indicator for whether the renewal process was successfully completed; or (ii) time
it takes to complete the renewal process conditional on successfully completing it; digital is an indicator for
whether the table uses a digital renewal process; ω is a vector of 28 renewal day fixed effects; and ξ is a
normally distributed error term independently and identically distributed over i and t, and clustered at the
police officer level.
As explained in the previous section, a unique feature of this study is the existence of technical failures.
To the extent that technical failures affect renewal tables following the digital process randomly, they can be
used to estimate the causal effect of information technologies on ID card provision outcomes by comparing
applicant-police officer pairs randomly assigned to the digital process after controlling for police officer fixed
effects. This allows controlling for unobserved heterogeneity at the police officer level in the model. Formally:
yijt = δ + γdigitalit + θj + ξijt (1.2)
where digital is an indicator for whether the police officer follows a digital renewal process on day t ; and
θ is a vector of 41 police officer fixed effects. To the extent that I only look at renewals in this study, an
important thing to highlight here also is that differential paperwork quality among applicants to complete
the process should not be a source of bias in this setting.5
There are several mechanisms through which information technologies might affect renewal outcomes
in this setting. First, information technologies may affect renewal success rates by reducing administrative
5I am not able to use a specification of the model that includes both police officer and renewal day fixed effects because
data on technical failures from administrative records is only collected on a daily basis. This means that I do not have variation
in type of renewal by police officer within day of renewal.
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shortcomings, reducing transaction costs, and limiting the possibility that police officers exercise discretion
as far as missing vital records. Second, information technologies may affect the time it takes to complete
a renewal process through two different channels. On the one hand, information technologies may increase
productivity among police officers by introducing efficiencies within the process, such as accessing the vital
records of the applicants online, getting the picture taken at the renewal table, etc. On the second hand,
information technologies may reduce the probability that red tape affects applicants by allowing them to
perform all of the renewals steps at the renewal table.
The use of information technologies might also affect renewal outcomes through the aplicants’ and po-
lice officers’ characteristics. First, applicant’s characteristics might be important determinants of renewal
outcomes. For instance, if an applicant finds it hard to navigate the renewal process steps because he is
illiterate, this would translate into differential renewal outcomes based on the level of education of the appli-
cant. Second, police officers characteristics such as age, rank, and education may be important determinants
of variation in efficiency within the administrative procedures required to complete the renewal process. For
instance, if the skills required to complete the process are highly correlated with police officers’ character-
istics, these might translate into different renewal outcomes based on police officers’ characteristics. Third,
police officers’ tenure may affect the renewal process through a learning effect. For instance, police officers
that have been working at the Identification Unit for a longer time might be more familiar with the process
and, thus, be able to outperform compared to police officers recently brought into the process. To formally
explore all of these hypotheses, I use the following three regression models:
yijt = α+ β(digitalit ∗Ai) + ψdigitalit + δAi + ωt + ξij (1.3)
yijt = α+ β(digitalit ∗Ai) + ψdigitalit + δAi + ωj + ξit (1.4)
yijt = α+ β(digitalit ∗ Pj) + ψdigitalit + µPj + ωt + ξij (1.5)
where Ai is a vector of applicant characteristics including age, education, gender, rural status, attended
private school (which serves as a proxy of social status), indigenous language spoken, and indigenous attire;
and Pj is a vector of police officer characteristics including tenure at the Identification Unit, tenure at the
renewal table, rank, age, education, and gender.
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Data
The data for this paper come from multiple sources and combine different methods of inquiry. The primary
data collected at the applicant level include the following: (i) starting and completion renewal times; (ii)
renewal table number; and (iii) basic socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. The administrative
data collected at the police officer level include the following: (i) renewal table number; (ii) basic socioeco-
nomic and demographic characteristics; and (ii) technical failures at renewal tables. All of the data were
collected between October 27 and December 5, 2009.
Primary data
The primary data were collected using a very simple software specifically designed for this study. Figure
1.1 shows a screenshot of the software interface used for the data collection.6 The software collected basic
information for the applicants including starting and completion times, renewal day, renewal table number,
sex, age, rural status, education level, whether the applicant ever attended a private school, whether the
applicant spoke an indigenous language, and neighborhood of residence. I also collected information on
indigenous attire for female applicants only, who can easily and objectively be classified across indigenous-
status by simple inspection of their clothing — which is not the case for men.7 The information on sex,
age, rural status, education level, and residence was directly collected from the expired ID card. If another
document was used as proof as identity, then this information was directly collected from the applicant. The
information about indigenous language and private school status was self-reported by applicants, and the
information about indigenous attire was collected from direct observation.
Administrative data
The basic socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of police officers were collected from administrative
records provided by the Identification Unit. These data included sex, age, rank, years of education, tenure
at the Identification Unit, and tenure at the renewal table. The information on technical failures among the
digital tables was also collected from administrative records and it was collected on a daily basis.
6The software was installed in three computers located next to the randomization table, and two computers located at the
exit door. All of the five computers were operated by police officers from the Identification Unit, which were unrelated to the
renewal process and just hired to perform this task.
7Indigenous women wear their hair in two long braids decorated with tassels, and dress in distinctive skirts over puffy
petticoats.
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Subpopulation of analysis
The subpopulation of analysis in this study are all individuals who officially applied for an ID card renewal, in
the city of La Paz, during the data collection time period. This subpopulation of analysis is not representative
of the whole population, but rather of those individuals who decide to apply for an ID card renewal. The
sample of applicants used in the subsequent analysis excludes all applicants younger than 21 years old and
those older than 100 years old.
Descriptive statistics
The summary statistics of the data used in the study are presented in Table 1.2. The statistics are estimated
separately by completion status and type of renewal process. The type of renewal process for digital tables
does not correspond to the original renewal process, but rather to an ex-post measure already adjusted
for technical failures. Panel A presents the ex-post average values for the outcome variables considered
in the paper, which are measured at the police officer-applicant pair level. Panels B and C report the
basic characteristics of applicants and police officers. These are ex-ante characteristics measured at the
randomization table. Panel D summarizes technical failures measured at the renewal day-table level. The
aim of this summary table is twofold. First is to verify that police officers and applicants characteristics
are well balanced across type of renewal process. Second, is to explore whether ex-post successful and
unsuccessful applicants might vary systematically along some of these characteristics.
The average age of an applicant for both the digital and manual renewal tables is 40 years old, with
roughly 48 percent of them being women in both groups. About 63 percent of applicants in both groups
have finished high school, and a low 14 percent of those who ever attended school were enrolled in a private
school across the two type of renewal groups. Roughly 16 percent of the applicants assigned to either of the
renewal processes are from the rural area. On average, 56 percent of applicants who start the renewal process
speak an indigenous language (55.5 percent in the digital tables group and 56.3 percent in the manual tables
group), and 30 percent of women wear an indigenous attire (29.6 percent in the digital tables group and 31.1
percent in the manual tables group). The differences in sample means along all these basic characteristics
of applicants are not significant at the 5 percent level.8
As for public officials, the average tenure at the renewal table is 1 year (1.18 for public officials at
digital renewal tables and 0.96 for those at manual ones). A typical police officer has been working at the
Identification Unit for about 3 years (2.97 for public officials at digital renewal tables and 3.04 for those at
8Census data for the city of La Paz reports the following average characteristics for the population: 51 percent women,
44 percent completed high school (average years of education is 9.4), 22 years old, 38 percent live in the rural areas, and 68
percent are indigenous.
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manual ones). Further, a typical police officer is 35 years old (33.94 for those digital renewal tables and 37.91
for those at manual ones), and has 13 years of completed school (13.44 for those at digital renewal tables and
12.78 for those at manual ones). About 64 percent of police officers are low rank (61.11 at digital renewal
tables and 67.83 at manual ones), and only 24 percent are women (22.2 for those at digital renewal tables
and 26.1 for those at manual ones). Although some of the difference in means seem large (police officer age,
sex, and rank), none of the differences in means are significant at the 5 percent level. Overall, the statistics
reported above suggest a good balance of applicants and police officers across type of renewal process.
The table also shows that only 66 percent of applicants assigned to a manual table get to complete the
renewal process. In contrast, almost 82 percent of applicants assigned to a digital table get to complete
the renewal process successfully. The difference in sample means across type of renewal process is large
and significant at the 5 percent level. For applicants who get to complete the process, a typical renewal
process takes roughly 85 minutes in a digital table and 129 minutes in a manual one. The difference in
sample means across type of renewal process is again significant at the 5 percent level. Despite the fact that
ex-ante characteristics of applicants do not vary substantially across type of renewal process, ex-post the
characteristics of applicants vary substantially across completion status. For instance, comparing Column
(3) with Column (5), and comparing Column (4) with Column (6), I see that applicants who do not get
to complete the renewal process are on average less educated, come from the rural area, are less likely to
have attended a private school, and are more likely to be of indigenous descent (either speak an indigenous
language or wear indigenous attire). The differences in sample means for all of the applicants’ characteristics
(except for age) are significant at 5 percent level (both for successful and unsuccessful applicants).
Discussion of experimental results
Renewal success rates
Table 1.3 presents the effects of information technologies on the probability of successfully completing a
renewal process. All the coefficients reported are marginal effects from probit regressions, and are separately
estimated for male and female applicants to exploit the indigenous attire data collected for the subsample
of female applicants.9 The effect of information technologies over traditional technologies after controlling
for renewal day fixed effects — that is, the coefficient β in Equation 1.1 — is presented in columns (1)
and (3) for male and female applicants, respectively. Columns (2) and (4) present instead the effect of
information technologies over traditional technologies after controlling for police officer fixed effects — that
9Table A1-1 in the Appendix reports the results for the pooled sample, and shows that the sex of the applicant is not an
important determinant of renewal outcomes.
11
is, the coefficient γ in Equation 1.2. The estimation of these two regression models allows for assessing the
extent to which unobserved police officer characteristics might be correlated with the ability to successfully
complete a renewal process. Columns (5) to (8) show the results of estimating Equations 1.3 and 1.4,
which control for the characteristics of the applicants and allow for technologies to interact with these
characteristics. Columns (5) and (6) show the estimates for the subsample of male applicants, while those
for female applicants are reported in columns (7) and (8). These alternative specifications allow assessing
the extent to which applicants’s characteristics might be important determinants of success rates across type
of renewal process.
The results in Table 1.3 show that the adoption of information technologies resulted in an overall im-
provement in the service provided by the Police within the process of renewing an ID card. Male applicants
randomly assigned to the digital renewal process have on average between 11.55 to 13.22 percentage points
higher probability of completing the process as compared to those randomly assigned to the manual one —
11.55 when controlling for renewal day fixed effects and 13.22 when controlling for police officer fixed effects.
All of these effects are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The estimates in columns (3) and (4)
corroborate these findings for the subsample of female applicants. Female applicants randomly assigned to
the digital renewal process have on average between 10.43 to 13.59 percentage points higher probability of
completing the process as compared to those randomly assigned to the manual one — 13.59 when controlling
for renewal day fixed effects and 10.43 when controlling for police officer fixed effects. All these effects are
also statistically significant at the 1 percent.
The characteristics of applicants should not affect success rates. In practice, however, they might if police
officers do not provide a homogeneous service across the population or if applicants are affected by bureau-
cracy differently based on their characteristics. Next, I explore the possibility that applicants’ characteristics
might be important determinants of success rates. The results of this exercise are presented in columns (5)
to (8) and interestingly present strong evidence that indeed success rates vary systematically across renewal
process based on the characteristics of the applicants. Applicants from relatively disadvantaged backgrounds
are much less likely to complete the renewal process. On average, applicants from rural areas are 10 per-
centage points less likely to complete the renewal process as compared to those from the urban area — 9.17
to 11.80 percentage points depending on the sex of applicant and specification of the model. Applicants
who did not complete high school are roughly 4 percentage points less likely to complete the renewal process
as compared to those who did complete high school — 4.28 to 4.91 percentage points depending on the
specification. Senior people are 3 percentage points less likely to complete the renewal process as compared
to relatively younger applicants — 2.03 to 3.27 percentage points depending on the specification. Moreover,
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applicants who never attended private school and, thus, belong to a lower social status, are 10 percentage
points less likely to complete the renewal process as compared to those who attended a private school — 9.93
to 11.37 percentage points depending on the specification. Lastly indigenous male applicants, as measured
by the ability to speak an indigenous language, are roughly 7 percentage points less likely to complete the
renewal process as compared to non-indigenous male applicants — 7.32 to 7.39 percentage points depending
on the specification. Female applicants wearing an indigenous attire are instead 13 percentage points less
likely to complete the renewal process as compared to those female applicants who were not wearing an
indigenous attire — 13.26 to 13.38 percentage points depending on the specification. All of these correla-
tions are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Interestingly, speaking an indigenous language does
not seem to be relevant to explain success rates among female applicants after the wearing of an indigenous
attire has been controlled for. This suggests that visual inspection might be a more important aspect of
being indigenous for citizens’ lives as opposed to speaking an indigenous language. Further, it suggests that
clothing inspection might be a better measure to classify ethnicity among Bolivian women as opposed to
language spoken.
A natural next question that arises is whether the adoption of information technologies within the renewal
process might have reduced some of these observed gaps in success rates across the characteristics of the
applicants. To examine this, I look at whether the impacts of information technologies differ across applicants
with different background characteristics. The estimates are reported in columns (5) to (8), and present one
of the most important findings of this paper namely that the digital renewal process is able to reduce most of
the observed disparities in renewal outcomes across the characteristics of applicants. In particular, the effect
of coming from the rural area is smaller in magnitude and opposite in sign to the magnitude of the effect
of the interaction of coming from the rural area with being assigned to a digital process (0.1522 to 0.1622,
depending on the specification). These interactions are all significant at the 1 percent level. The magnitude
of the effect of having completed high school is similar in magnitude and opposite in sign to the magnitude of
the effect of the interaction of having completed high school with being assigned to a digital process (0.0426
to 0.0647, depending on the specification). All of these interactions are significant at the 5 percent level.
The difference in success rates among senior and younger applicants is reduced by roughly 5 percentage
points when applicants are randomly assigned to the digital process as compared to the manual one, though
this difference is only significant at standard levels for male applicants. In particular, the magnitude of
the effect of being a senior applicant is similar in magnitude and opposite in sign to the magnitude of the
effect of the interaction of having completed high school with being assigned to a digital process (0.0573
to 0.0574, depending on the specification). All of these interactions are again significant at the 1 percent
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level. Moreover, the gap in success rates between indigenous and non-indigenous applicants as measured
by the knowledge of an indigenous language, is reduced by around 5 percentage points when applicants
are randomly assigned to the digital renewal process as opposed to the manual one. The magnitude of the
effect of speaking an indigenous language is similar in magnitude and opposite in sign compared to the
magnitude of the effect of the interaction of being a rural applicant with being assigned to a digital process
(0.0511 to 0.0574, depending on the specification). All of these interactions are significant at the 1 percent
level. Lastly, the difference in success rates between indigenous and non-indigenous females as measured by
indigenous attire, is reduced by around 8 percentage points when applicants are randomly assigned to the
digital renewal process as compared to the manual one (0.0814 and 0.0839, depending on the specification,
all significant at the 5 percent level).
As a final exercise, I look at whether the characteristics of police officers might in practice affect success
rates. Technology and skills are often believed to be complementary (e.g. Van Reenen and Chennells (2002)
and Machin, McNally, and Silva (2006)). Yet, given the homogeneity of police officers and the simple skills
required to complete the renewal process, the characteristics of police officers are a priori not expected to
affect success rates in this setting. Table A1-2, in the Appendix, presents the results of this exercise. As
expected given the nature of the police officers’ randomization process, background characteristics of police
officers are not significantly correlated with success rates. Moreover, the interactions between technologies
and police officers’ characteristics are small in magnitude and never significant at standard levels. This is
reassuring and suggests that the variation in success rates observed in the data is not the result of observed
differences in police officer characteristics.
Time it takes to complete renewal
Table 1.4 presents the effect of information technologies on the time it takes to complete a renewal process.
For the estimation of these coefficients, I focus on the subsample of applicants who were successful at
completing the renewal process. All coefficients are again separately estimated for male and female applicants
to exploit the data about indigenous attire collected only for the subsample of female applicants. Columns
(1) and (2) present the results from the two basic specifications of the model (Equations 2.1 and 2.2) for the
subsample of male applicants. Columns (3) and (4) present analog estimates for the subsample of female
applicants. In columns (5) and (6), I present estimates from the augmented models (Equations 1.3 and
1.4) for the subsample of male applicants. Finally, in columns (7) and (8), I report the results of these two
augmented models for the subsample of female applicants.
The results in Table 1.4 show that information technologies allow for important efficiencies within the
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renewal process of renewing an ID card, which directly translate into an improvement in the quality of
service provided by the Police to applicants. Male applicants randomly assigned to the digital renewal
process take on average between 40.01 to 43.64 fewer minutes to complete the renewal process as compared
to those randomly assigned to the manual process — 40.01 when controlling for renewal day fixed effects
and 43.64 when controlling for police officer fixed effects. All these effects are statistically significant at the
1 percent level. The estimates in columns (3) and (4) corroborate these findings for the subsample of female
applicants. Female applicants randomly assigned to the digital renewal process take on average between
39.14 to 43.57 fewer minutes to complete the renewal process as compared to those randomly assigned to
the manual process — 43.57 when controlling for renewal day fixed effects and 39.14 when controlling for
police officer fixed effects. Again, all of these coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. Looking
across all the specifications shown, I conclude that information technologies are reducing the time it takes to
renew an ID card by an average of about 40 minutes. Compared with a level of 128 minutes among manual
renewal tables, these point estimates imply a reduction in the time it takes to complete the renewal process
of about 31 percent compared to the level in manual renewal tables, which is quite substantial. Figure 1.2
shows these results graphically presenting for each type of renewal process the estimated probability density
function, where the function is estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel. The results show that the time it
takes to complete a renewal process is lower for the digital renewal process along all of the percentiles in the
distribution. The two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic testing for equality of both density functions is
0.5817 (p-value=0.000).
The effect of applicants’ characteristics on the time it takes to renew an ID card shows a similar pattern to
that reported for the probability of completing the renewal process. Applicants from relatively disadvantaged
backgrounds take longer to complete the renewal process when randomly assigned to the digital renewal
process as compared to the manual one. Applicants from rural areas take on average 17 minutes more to
complete the renewal process as compared to those from the urban area (roughly 13 percent more of the
mean renewal time among applicants assigned to the manual process). Applicants who did not complete
high school take on average 11 minutes more to complete the renewal process as compared to those who
did complete high school (roughly 8.5 percent more of the mean renewal time among applicants assigned
to the manual process). Senior people take on average 2 minutes more to complete the renewal process
as compared to younger applicants, though this is only significant among female applicants (roughly this
corresponds to 7 percent of the mean renewal time among applicants assigned to the manual process).
Moreover, applicants who attended a public school, and thus belong to lower socioeconomic strata, take
approximately 6 minutes more to complete the renewal process as compared to those who attended private
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school (this roughly corresponds to 5 percent more of the mean renewal time among applicants assigned to
the manual process). Finally, indigenous male applicants, as measured by the ability to speak an indigenous
language, take on average 3 minutes more to complete the renewal process as compared to those of non-
indigenous descent (2 percent more of the mean renewal time among applicants assigned to the manual
process). Female applicants wearing an indigenous attire take on average 4 minutes more to complete the
renewal process as compared to female applicants not wearing an indigenous attire (3 percent more of the
mean renewal time among applicants assigned to the manual process). Consistent with previous findings,
speaking an indigenous language is not relevant to explain renewal time for renewal among female applicants
after wearing of an indigenous attire has been controlled for. All these coefficients are statistically significant
at the 5 percent level.
Table 1.4 also reports the interactions between the information technologies coefficient and the charac-
teristics of the applicants. These estimates present evidence that information technologies do have different
effects on time it takes to complete a renewal process based on the characteristics of the applicants. These
effects, however, are relatively modest compared to those found for success rates. On average, information
technologies reduce the gap between rural and urban applicants by 14 minutes — this is roughly 11 percent
of the mean renewal time among applicants assigned to the manual process. Information technologies also
reduce the gap in success rates among applicants who completed high school and those who did not. The
reduction in the gap is around 10 minutes, which roughly corresponds to 8 percent of the mean renewal time
among applicants assigned to the manual process. Lastly, the gap in success rates between applicants who
never attended private school and those who did is reduced by 4 minutes, which corresponds to 3 percent
of the mean renewal time among applicants assigned to the manual process. The magnitude of all of these
coefficients is consistent across all specifications of the model and the sex of the applicant. Further, all these
interactions are significant at the 5 percent level.
For completeness, Table A1-2, in the Appendix, explores also whether information technologies might
affect the time it takes to complete the process by interacting with some of the observed characteristics of
police officers. Consistent with the previous findings for success rates, the characteristics of police officers
have no power to explain variation in the time it takes to complete a renewal process. Estimates are always
small in magnitude and never significant at standard levels.
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Are differences in renewal outcomes based on characteristics of applicants fully
eliminated by the digital process?
An interesting exercise is checking whether the use of technologies in this setting are able to eliminate the
differences in renewal outcomes based on the characteristics of applicants. To do so, I test for whether
the different characteristics of applicants and its interaction with the type of renewal process are jointly
significant at the 10 percent level. The intuition behind this test is the following. If I fail to reject the null
that a specific characteristic of an applicant and its interaction with the digital renewal process is significant,
that would indicate that disparities in renewal outcomes along that dimension have been eliminated by the
digital process. That is, it would mean that under the digital process it would no longer matter whether the
individual is from the rural or urban area, whether he is from an indigenous background or not, and so on
and so forth.
The results of these tests of significance are presented in Table 1.5. The statistics correspond to the
estimates reported in columns (5), (6), (7), and (8) of Tables 1.3 and 1.4, which correspond to the full
specification of the model estimated separately for the subsample of male and female applicants using the
two identification strategies. The reported coefficients are the combined estimates of the null hypotheses
reported in the left hand side. The p-values correspond to the χ2 and F statistics for the null hypotheses
of the success indicator and duration outcomes, respectively. The statistics suggest that the digital renewal
process is successful at eliminating many of the observed differences in success rates among male applicants,
including those resulting from the educational level and indigenous background of the applicant. In fact,
under the digital renewal process rural male applicants are actually between 3.47 and 4.09 percent more likely
to complete the renewal process than male applicants from the urban areas depending on the specification,
and senior male applicants are between 1.42 and 2.53 percent more likely to complete the renewal process as
compared to younger male applicants. In contrast, male applicants from poorer backgrounds as measured
by attendance to a public school are still between 5.02 and 5.52 percent less likely to complete the renewal
process as compared to those from relatively better off backgrounds.
The digital renewal process is also successful at eliminating the differences in success rates among female
applicants based on educational level, indigenous attire, and socioeconomic status as measured by whether
the female applicant attended public school. Further, under the digital renewal process, rural female ap-
plicants are actually between 6.86 and 6.95 percent more likely to complete the renewal process than male
applicants from the urban areas, depending on the specification, senior female applicants are between 0.56
and 4.89 percent more likely to complete the renewal process as compared to younger female applicants, and
female applicants from indigenous backgrounds as measured by attire are between 4.96 and 5.11 percent
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more likely to complete the renewal process as compared to those from non-indigenous backgrounds.
Moreover, the digital renewal process is also successful at eliminating most of the observed differences in
time it takes to successfully complete a renewal process based on the characteristics of applicants. All dif-
ferences observed among male applicants in the manual process based on their characteristics are eliminated
within the digital process, except for those based on the rural status of the applicant and the socioeconomic
status as measured by whether the male applicant attended public school. Yet, under the digital renewal
process, rural male applicants still take between 3.07 and 3.15 more minutes to complete the renewal process
as compared to male applicants from urban areas, depending on the specification, and male applicants from
poorer backgrounds as measured by attendance to a public school take on average 1.44 more minutes to
complete the renewal process as compared to those from relatively better off backgrounds. In contrast,
all differences observed among female applicants in the manual process based on their characteristics are
eliminated within the digital process, except for those based on the indigenous attire and socioeconomic
status as measured by whether the female applicant attended a public school. Under the digital process,
female applicants from relatively poorer backgrounds as measured by attendance to a public school still take
on average 1.94 more minutes to complete the renewal process as compared to those from relatively better
off backgrounds, and female applicants from indigenous backgrounds as measured by attire take on average
3.16 more minutes to complete the renewal process as compared to those from non-indigenous backgrounds.
Interpretation
A natural question that arises is why information technologies might be affecting renewal outcomes and, even
more interesting, why in this setting they are so effective at lowering barriers in access to ID cards by citizens.
To the extent that I only look at renewals in this study, differential paperwork quality among applicants
required to complete the process is not a possible explanation for the variation in renewal outcomes observed
in the data. More specifically, individuals applying for an ID card renewal are applicants who five years ago
(i.e. the renewal time frame) were able to successfully obtain an ID card. This implicitly means that the
Identification Unit should already have all the paperwork required to complete the renewal process for each
of those applicants. Moreover, if selection bias based on paperwork quality might be an issue here, I would
expect to observe exactly the opposite. Given that rural applicants face higher time and money costs to
access the Identification Unit, rural applicants should in general have higher quality paperwork conditional
on getting to the Unit.
Information technologies in this setting clearly introduce efficiencies within the renewal process, including
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accessing the vital records of the applicants online and reducing administrative shortcomings such as deficient
record keeping, typing mistakes, etc. Further, information technologies significantly facilitate the process
for applicants by allowing them to perform all of the renewal process steps within one physical location.
Yet, the differential effects of these technologies across the characteristics of applicants, and the fact that
the characteristics of applicants are important determinants of variation in renewal outcomes, is not fully
consistent with a simple story of efficiencies within this process. In particular, the fact that the characteristics
of applicants are important predictors of variation in renewal outcomes is consistent with four hypotheses.
First, police officers might not be providing a homogeneous service across the population, wherein police
officers provide different service quality to applicants based on their intrinsic characteristics. The provision
of different service quality to applicants in detriment of applicants of relatively disadvantaged backgrounds
has been previously reported as an important barrier in access to ID cards by citizens in Bolivia (e.g. World
Bank (2000), Mansilla (2003), Quintana (2003), and Wanderley (2007)). My results are consistent with all of
this previous evidence based on qualitative data. Further, to the extent that information technologies reduce
the possibility of exercising discretion as far as missing vital records across applicants, this hypothesis is also
consistent with the observed reduction in success rates gaps across applicants resulting from the use of these
technologies. Yet, if differential service quality provision to applicants based on their characteristics were
the only mechanism operating to lower barriers in access to ID cards in this setting, I would not expect to
observe changes in the time it takes to complete a renewal resulting from the adoption of these technologies.
In particular, information technologies do not introduce any particular incentive for police officers to change
their service provision patterns based on the type of renewal. To this end, it is plausible that something
else, in addition to differential service quality provision to applicants based on their characteristics, might be
operating here that is forcing police officers to discriminate less frequently against relatively disadvantaged
applicants when randomly assigned to the digital process.
A second hypothesis that is consistent with the fact that applicants’ characteristics are important de-
terminants of access to ID cards is that police officers might be practicing selective enforcement of rules.
Selective enforcement of rules is possible, in this setting, because of the opportunities that police officers
have to exercise discretion at completing some of the renewal steps. The intuition behind the selective
enforcement of rules is as follows. To maximize the possibility of extracting bribes from applicants, police
officers would purposely complicate the process to create incentives for applicants to incur in extra-legal
payments and finish with the process. Applicants at higher risk of being targeted are those from relatively
disadvantaged backgrounds, which tend to be less demanding and likely to voice complaints. These results
would be consistent with previous literature on petty corruption within public service delivery in several
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developing countries, and would also be consistent with the possibility that information technologies might
act as a brake to curb petty corruption within this specific bureaucratic process.10 Moreover, the existence
of petty corruption within the the Bolivian Police has already been documented (PNUD, 2006). In an
interesting nationally representative survey about the bureaucratic services provided by the Police, only 28
percents of citizens agreed that it was possible to successfully complete a bureaucratic process involving the
Police without having to incur an extra-legal payment, 47 percent of citizens admitted to have paid at least
an extra-legal payment in the last year in order to facilitate the completion of a bureaucratic process, and
30 percent of citizens reported explicitly being asked for a bribe by a police officer in order to complete a
process. By eliminating the possibility that police officers might lie about not finding the vital records of
an applicant, information technologies implicitly add an accountability mechanism into the renewal process.
This accountability mechanism might be successfully operating in this setting to reduce barriers in access to
ID cards by explicitly altering the probability of detecting malpractices among police officers.
The third hypothesis consistent with the fact that applicants characteristics are important determinants
of renewal outcomes is that excessive bureaucracy or red tape affects applicants differently based on their
characteristics. For instance, illiterate applicants might find it harder to navigate the renewal process
steps than those applicants with some schooling because they are not able to read the signs at the Unit.
This would be further exacerbated by the fact that police officers seem to be quite efficient at identifying
relatively disadvantaged applicants so as to search for opportunities to extract bribes. Excess bureaucracy
might be intimidating to many people, particularly so to groups socially excluded from the mainstream.
It is usually believed that people from relatively disadvantaged backgrounds are less able to access and
process information, in part because they have relatively limited education. Endogenous red tape might
be introducing an important inequality dimension into the renewal process by requiring some skills from
applicants to successfully complete the process. To the extent that these skills are not necessarily uniformly
distributed across applicants, this would directly translate into differential renewal outcomes based on the
characteristics of the applicants. By allowing applicants to perform all the renewal steps within one physical
location, information technologies might be significantly facilitating the process for the applicant and, thus,
reducing observed gaps in renewal outcomes based on the characteristics of applicants.
Lastly, bureaucratic delay might affect applicants based on their time preferences and, thereinafter, affect
10The literature on corruption within public service delivery has looked mainly at how bureaucrats price discriminate when
setting bribes and the social and economic costs of corruption. Svensson (2003) and Fisman and Svensson (2007) find evidence
that corrupt bureaucrats act as price discriminators in determining access to public services. Olken and Barron (2009) collect
field data on bribe payments by truckers to road post officials, in Indonesia, and find evidence that corrupt bureaucrats behave
like price discriminating profit-maximizing firms. Bertrand, Djankov, Hanna, and Mullainathan (2007) provide experimental
evidence that bureaucrats undercut existing regulations on obtaining a driving license, in India, responding to the needs of
private agents. Sequeira and Djankov (2008) find empirical evidence that bureaucrats working in ports within Southern Africa
price-discriminate according to characteristics of the shipments and products when setting bribes.
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the success rates based on their intrinsic characteristics. For instance, applicants who find bureaucratic delay
overwhelming might decide to drop out at some point in the middle of the renewal process and come back
at some other point in time to the Identification Unit to start a new renewal process (renewal processes
cannot be put on hold — if they are not completed by the end of the day, the applicant needs to start a
whole new renewal process). Because of the nature of my data collection, drop-outs are implicitly classified
as unsuccessful applicants in my sample. Yet, it is highly unlikely that these represent a large proportion of
unsuccessful applicants. In particular, applicants deciding to drop-out in the middle of the renewal process
face transportation expenses and substantial time costs. Because of the marking ink used to mark applicants’
thumbnails at the randomization table, applicants cannot start a new renewal process right away but need
to wait for at least a couple of days until the marking ink has faded away. Further, deciding to drop-out
in the middle of the renewal process is very costly for the applicant to the extent that queuing time at the
randomization table can easily take between 40 to 60 minutes. Therefore, drop-outs should be minimal in
my sample and occur only randomly across the population of applicants. In addition, there is a piece of
evidence against the possibility that drop-outs might be occurring systematically in my sample. Applicants
from relatively stronger backgrounds are, in general, expected to have a higher opportunity costs of their
time (e.g. Frey (1971), Shaw (1992)). If differences in time preferences might be driving my results, I
would expect to observe that applicants from relatively better-off backgrounds tend to be more unsuccessful,
perhaps dropping-out to look for an unofficial way to get their ID cards. However, I observe the opposite in
my sample. Applicants from relatively disadvantaged backgrounds tend to be more unsuccessful. Therefore,
my results present little evidence to support the hypothesis that bureaucratic delay might be affecting
applicants renewal outcomes based on their intrinsic time preferences.
Concluding remarks
Public service delivery in developing countries is rife with red tape, corruption, and bureaucratic delay. As
information technologies continue to rapidly evolve, policy makers and regulators in developing countries
are increasingly adopting them as a tool to enhance government efficiency, public administration, and trans-
parency. This paper builds on the empirical micro literature about the effects of information technologies on
public service delivery, and provides evidence that it might be possible to dramatically improve the quality
of public service delivery by the adoption of simple information technologies. Further, it shows evidence that
under the right set of conditions, information technologies might prove effective tools at lowering barriers in
access to public services.
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I investigate the potential of information technologies to improve public service delivery in the context
of two unusual randomized natural experiments occurring within one particular bureaucratic process: the
renewal of a national identification card by the Bolivian Police. The results of this paper show that the
introduction of information technologies into this bureaucratic process led to significant improvements in
the quality of service provided to citizens. Applicants assigned to the digital renewal process are on average
12 percentage points more likely to complete the renewal process as compared to those assigned to the
traditional old manual process. Further, applicants assigned to the digital renewal process who are able
to complete the process take, on average, 31 percent less time to complete the process as compared to
those assigned to the manual one. In this setting, information technologies seem to be translating into
an improvement in overall efficiency within this bureaucratic process by allowing for efficiencies within the
renewal process, including accessing the vital records of the applicants online, and reducing administrative
shortcomings such as deficient recording, typing mistakes, etc.
Moreover, my results present strong evidence that the use of information technologies within this bu-
reaucratic process is an effective tool at lowering barriers in access to national identification cards by citizens
and, thus, an effective tool at promoting equitable public service delivery. Information technologies, in this
setting, seem to be translating into an a more homogeneous quality of service across applicants by reduc-
ing transaction costs (allowing applicants to perform all of the renewal process steps within one physical
location) and improving accountability (eliminating the possibility that police officers might lie about not
finding the vital records of an applicant as now they can access vital records online that allow applicants
to directly monitor this process).11 I discuss several mechanisms through which information technologies
might be promoting equitable public service delivery within this bureaucratic process. Overall, my findings
are consistent with the existence of differential service quality provision to applicants based on their charac-
teristics and selective enforcement of rules by police officers, and the possibility that red tape might affect
applicants differently based on their intrinsic characteristics.
Given the significant low quality of public service delivery in developing countries, and the relatively
low cost of adopting these technologies, the results presented in this paper are encouraging. Despite that
the role of technologies will clearly vary from place to place and from service to service, the results of this
paper present strong evidence that information technologies have the potential to transform the way in
which governments interact with citizens and the manner in which services are delivered to the public. This
paper provides some insights into attempts at public service reform in developing countries and suggests
that, under a right set of circumstances and government implementation capacity, information technologies
11Under the manual renewal process, the vital records of the applicants are accessed directly from a Vital Records Archive
maintained at the basement of the building which is only accessible to police officers
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can serve as an effective tool to advance development objectives.
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Chapter 1 Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: Software platform used for the data collection at the Identification
Unit, La Paz, Bolivia, 2009
Figure 1.2: Empirical distribution of the time it takes to complete a renewal, La
Paz, Bolivia, 2009
Note: The empirical probability distribution function is estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel.
BW=5. The two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions yields
0.5817 (p-value=0.000).
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Table 1.1: Relationship between the probability of being assigned to the
digital renewal process, police officers, and applicant characteristics, La Paz,
Bolivia, 2009a
Digital Digital Digital Digital Digital
process process process process process
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All police Male Female
officers applicants applicants
Police officer has low tenure at renewal table -0.0647**
(0.035)
Police officer is low rank 0.0481*
(0.032)
Police officer did not go to college -0.0211
(0.173)
Police officer is a senior (>35 years old) -0.1826
(0.167)
Police officer is female -0.0145
(0.187)
Applicant is from the rural area -0.0394* -0.0405* -0.0072 -0.0052
(0.023) (0.023) (0.016) (0.016)
Applicant did not finish high school 0.0191 0.0196 -0.0298* -0.0288*
(0.021) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016)
Applicant speaks an indigenous language 0.0045 0.0031 0.0026 0.0035
(0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016)
Applicant is a senior (>40 years old) -0.0168 -0.0158 -0.0063 -0.0056
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
Applicant attended a public school -0.0023 -0.0022 -0.0137 -0.0148
(0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.019)
Female applicant wearing indigenous attire 0.0121 0.0096
(0.016) (0.016)
Renewal day fixed effects No No Yes No Yes
Renewal table fixed effects No No No No No
Observations 41 10,029 10,029 9,513 9,513
p-value of all listed variables 0.17 0.12 0.18 0.11 0.10
a
Estimates reported are marginal effects from probit regressions. Standard errors in parentheses robust against arbitrary
heteroskedasticity in the variance-covariance matrix, and clustered at the table level across all specifications that
include a police officer-applicant pair level variable as dependent variable.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
* Significant at 10 percent.
25
Table 1.2: Summary statistics of renewal outcomes, applicants’ characteris-
tics, police officer characteristics, and technical failures, Bolivia, 2009a
All Applicants who Applicants who
applicants completed renewal did not complete renewal
Digital Manual Digital Manual Digital Manual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Applicant-police officer pair
Renewal time (in minutes) - - 85.16 128.99* - -
- - (28.05) (36.56) - -
Success rate (%) 81.97 66.29* - - - -
(38.44) (47.28) - - - -
Observations 6,690 12,852 5,484 8,519 1,206 4,333
Digital Manual Digital Manual Digital Manual
Panel B: Applicant characteristics
Age of the applicant (in years) 40.26 40.99 40.09 39.99 41.04 42.98
(14.08) (14.60) (14.20) (14.40) (13.51) (14.78)
Applicant finished high school (%) 63.96 62.09 64.55 68.78* 61.28 48.95*
(48.01) (48.52) (47.84) (46.34) (48.73) (49.99)
Applicant is female (%) 48.09 48.99 47.25 49.49* 51.91 48.00*
(49.97) (49.99) (49.93) (50.00) (49.98) (49.97)
Applicant is from the rural area (%) 15.08 16.71 15.12 12.00* 14.93 25.99*
(35.79) (37.31) (35.82) (32.49) (35.65) (43.86)
Applicant attended private school (%) 14.90 14.19 15.26 17.11* 13.27 8.45*
(35.61) (34.90) (35.97) (37.67) (33.94) (27.81)
Applicant speaks an indigenous language (%) 55.52 56.34 55.54 50.45* 55.39 67.92*
(49.70) (49.60) (49.70) (50.00) (49.73) (46.68)
Female applicant wears indigenous attire (%) 29.59 31.08 29.91 23.08* 28.27 47.31*
(45.65) (46.29) (45.80) (42.14) (45.07) (49.94)
Observations 6,690 12,852 5,484 8,519 1,206 4,333
Digital Manual
Panel C: Police officer characteristics
Tenure at renewal table (in years) 1.18 0.96
(1.47) (1.45)
Tenure at Identification Unit (in years) 2.97 3.04
(2.28) (2.12)
Police officer is low rank (%) 67.83 61.11
(51.08) (50.16)
Police officer age (in years) 33.94 37.91
(8.95) (8.92)
Police officer years of education 13.44 12.78
(2.75) (1.78)
Police officer is female (%) 22.22 26.09
(42.78) (44.90)
Police officer speaks an indigenous language (%) 100.00 100.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Observations 18 23
Digital Manual
Panel D: Renewal table characteristics
Technical failure rate (%) 19.05 -
(39.31) -
Observations 18 23
a
Standard deviations in parentheses. Asterisks in columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) correspond to p<0.05 of the difference in means across
type of renewal process.
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Chapter 1 Appendix
Table 1.6: Information technologies, applicant characteristics, and renewal
outcomes: Pooled sample, La Paz, Bolivia, 2009a
Completed Completed Renewal Renewal
time time time time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Digital renewal process 0.0854*** 0.1044*** -34.4385*** -30.2110***
(0.033) (0.035) (1.695) (1.888)
Applicant is a woman 0.0169* 0.0167* 0.3232 0.3556
(0.009) (0.009) (0.792) (0.807)
Applicant is from the rural area -0.1205*** -0.1208*** 17.5266*** 17.4644***
(0.011) (0.011) (1.379) (1.401)
Applicant did not finish high school -0.0931*** -0.0926*** 11.7325*** 11.6634***
(0.008) (0.008) (1.480) (1.519)
Applicant speaks an indigenous language -0.0648*** -0.0646*** 1.2326 1.1600
(0.008) (0.009) (0.896) (0.930)
Applicant is s senior (>40 years old) -0.0210*** -0.0204** 1.9634** 2.2259**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.834) (0.852)
Applicant attended a public school -0.1030*** -0.1026*** 5.7138*** 5.7979***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.870) (0.866)
Digital*(Applicant is woman) 0.0509*** 0.0508*** -0.5912 -0.6777
(0.016) (0.016) (1.030) (1.048)
Digital*(Applicant is from the rural area) 0.1128*** 0.1127*** -14.7005*** -14.7137***
(0.013) (0.013) (1.844) (1.881)
Digital*(Applicant did not finish high school) 0.0662*** 0.0655*** -10.7895*** -10.8966***
(0.015) (0.015) (1.633) (1.679)
Digital*(Applicant speaks an indigenous language) 0.0731*** 0.0733*** -0.7500 -0.8998
(0.011) (0.011) (1.378) (1.363)
Digital*(Applicant is a senior) -0.0059 -0.0062 -1.7370 -1.7900
(0.017) (0.017) (1.279) (1.296)
Digital*(Applicant attended a public school) 0.0806*** 0.0800*** -4.0229*** -4.3694***
(0.025) (0.025) (1.150) (1.165)
Renewal day fixed effects Yes No Yes No
Renewal table fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Mean of dependent variable among applicants
in manual tables 0.6629 0.6629 128.99 128.99
Observations 19,542 19,542 14,003 14,003
a
Estimates reported are marginal effects from probit regressions. Standard errors in parentheses robust against arbitrary
heteroskedasticity in the variance-covariance matrix, and clustered at the table level across all specifications.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
* Significant at 10 percent.
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Table 1.7: Information technologies, renewal outcomes, and police officers’
characteristics, La Paz, Bolivia, 2009a
Completed Completed Renewal Renewal
process process time time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male Female Male Female
applicants applicants applicants applicants
Digital renewal process 0.1223*** 0.1260*** -47.5886*** -45.6537***
(0.023) (0.027) (2.754) (3.718)
Police officer has low tenure at renewal table -0.0122 0.0089 0.3889 3.0254*
(0.014) (0.014) (1.082) (1.763)
Police officer is low rank 0.0018 0.0073 -0.2834 -2.6698
(0.014) (0.016) (1.341) (1.792)
Police officer did not go to college 0.0097 0.0076 0.4980 0.3146
(0.014) (0.016) (1.786) (2.270)
Police officer is a senior (>35 years old) -0.0045 -0.0258 0.4742 2.0677
(0.013) (0.017) (1.313) (1.793)
Police officer is a woman -0.0043 -0.0185 -1.5828 2.1145
(0.012) (0.014) (1.379) (1.783)
Digital*(Police officer has low tenure at renewal table) -0.0126 -0.0013 1.6685 -0.9293
(0.023) (0.026) (2.287) (2.971)
Digital*(Police officer is low rank) -0.0223 0.0191 0.8561 1.3386
(0.021) (0.023) (2.492) (2.749)
Digital*(Police officer did not go to college) 0.0110 -0.0197 2.8066 3.0501
(0.022) (0.028) (2.455) (3.001)
Digital*(Police officer is a senior) -0.0154 0.0299 1.8210 0.2713
(0.021) (0.023) (2.230) (2.592)
Digital*(Police officer is a woman) 0.0206 0.0058 2.9751 3.2942
(0.023) (0.032) (2.869) (3.078)
Renewal day fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Renewal table fixed effects No No No No
Mean of dependent variable among
applicants in manual tables 0.7175 0.7155 128.55 129.45
Observations 10,029 9,513 7,196 6,807
a
Estimates for the completion of the renewal are marginal effects from probit regressions. Estimates for the time it takes to
complete renewal are OLS coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses robust against arbitrary heteroskedasticity in the
variance-covariance matrix, and clustered at the table level.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
* Significant at 10 percent.
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Chapter 2
Child labor and schooling responses
to unconditional cash transfer
programs: Evidence from Bolivia
Introduction
This paper considers the extent to which cash transfer programs might affect child labor and schooling
decisions by households when families are fully unconstrained in the use of the benefits from these programs.
More generally, it considers the extent to which relaxing liquidity constraints and improving access to
liquidity among poor households might induce households to reduce child labor. There is a large literature on
child labor that argues that improved access to liquidity might be an effective policy to attack the problem of
child labor in developing countries. A number of theoretical models on child labor, for instance, suggest that
liquidity constraints might give rise to inefficiently high levels of child labor by interfering with an optimal
intertemporal trade-off between immediate costs of schooling and potential long-run benefits of human capital
accumulation (e.g. Baland and Robinson (2000), Guarcello, Mealli, and Rosati (2010), Edmonds (2006)). A
related literature on the permanent income hypothesis and credit constraints also suggests that child labor
might be used by poor households to smooth consumption over time when other risk-coping instruments are
insufficient (e.g. Jacoby (1994), Jacoby and Skoufias (1997), Baland and Robinson (2000), Ranjan (2001),
Fitzsimmons (2003), Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti (2006), Duryea, Lam, and Levison (2007), Guarcello, Mealli,
and Rosati (2010)).
This paper adds to this literature by presenting evidence that, under some circumstances, unconditional
cash transfer programs that do not target behavioral changes might indirectly create incentives for poor
households to engage their children in child labor. In particular, picture the scenario where labor markets
are imperfect or missing, where hired labor cannot easily substitute for family labor due to moral hazard
problems, and where returns to experience from child labor are high. In such settings, if poor households
are able to allocate some of the benefits from these programs towards productive investments, they may find
it rational to increase child labor because of the increased opportunity cost of schooling for children.
To investigate whether unconditional cash transfer programs might translate into changes in children’s
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time allocation decisions, I take advantage of a policy quasi-experiment created by the introduction of a
large universal pension program in Bolivia, the Bolivida, which does not target specific behavioral changes.
To identify the causal effect of this program, I use two alternative identification strategies. In the first one, I
estimate average intent-to-treat effects of the program under a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, which
takes advantage of the fact that the probability of receiving the pension changes discontinuously at the
eligibility age. Specifically, my identification assumption is that children who live with an eligible person
differ from those who live with a near-eligible person only in the timing of the pension income. However, as
eligibility is perfectly correlated with age, a main concern in this setting is whether an eligibility indicator
might capture age trends in addition to the effect of the pension income. To address this issue, I combine
two empirical strategies. First, I limit my sample to children in households with an eligible elderly person
between the ages of 60 to 69 and directly control for the presence of an elder in the age range of 65 to 69.
Second, I include a third order polynomial expansion in the age of the oldest person in the household in each
of the parametric regression models I consider, wherein changes in children’s time allocation decisions caused
by the Bolivida are captured by an eligibility indicator. In the second identification strategy, I exploit the
instrumental variables connection to the fuzzy regression discontinuity design and parametrically estimate
average treatment effects on the subpopulation of beneficiaries by using eligibility as an instrumental variable
for Bolivida receipt (Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw, 2001).
The findings of this paper present some evidence that the Bolivida led to an increase in the probability
that children in the rural areas living in households with relatively low levels of assets were engaged in child
labor (5.53 percentage points). In contrast, the Bolivida led to a substantial reduction in the probability that
children in the urban areas living in households with relatively low levels of assets were engaged in child labor
(-32.97 percentage points), and in the number of hours urban children spend in farming and agricultural
activities (-146.45 percent reduction in hours worked). The changes in child labor as a result of the Bolivida,
however, did not translate into changes in school attendance among children. I discuss several reasons why
the Bolivida might affect children’s time allocation decisions, including the possibility that households engage
in bargaining behavior, that households might be myopic when making decisions regarding their children’s
human capital investments, and that households might be credit or liquidity constrained. Overall, my
findings seem to be most consistent with the existence of liquidity constraints among poor rural households.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides background on the Bolivida
program. Section 3 describes the data and subpopulation of analysis. Section 4 discusses the empirical
methodology, which includes a detailed description of my two identification strategies. Section 5 presents
the main findings of the paper. Section 6 considers various threats to the validity of my identification
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strategies. Section 7 discusses the mechanisms how the Bolivida might affect children’s time allocation
decisions in the light of my previous findings. Section 8 concludes.
The Bolivida Old-Age Pension Program
In the middle of the 1990s, an array of unprecedented structural reforms was implemented by the Bolivian
government with the aim of confronting a long-term stagnation of the economy. One of these reforms was the
so called “Capitalization”, which sold half of the six largest state-owned companies to private investors and
generated considerable revenues for the country. Another of these reforms was the pension system reform,
which eliminated the old publicly administered pay-as-you-go system and implemented the current privately
managed individually fully funded scheme. The implementation of these structural reforms faced strong
opposition and was legislated in the context of a run-up to a general election. As a mechanism to lower
opposition, the government introduced the Bolivida, a universal old-age pension scheme, which promised
tangible and immediate benefits to the citizens by redistributing some of the gains of the Capitalization
among the elderly.1
The Bolivida is an unconditional cash transfer program, which is paid to all Bolivians aged 65 and older
independent of their income levels and their previous contributions to the system. 2 The program consists
of a flat benefit paid to each elder independently of his living arrangements (i.e. the household gets an
independent payment for each elder in the household). Since its inception, in 1997, the program has gone
through several reformulations in both the size of the benefit and the timing of the payments. Figure 2.1, in
the Appendix, illustrates the changes in the size of the benefit across time. Starting at USD 248 per annum,
the Bolivida payments account for 50 to 85 percent of the total annual income of the poor and extremely
poor households, respectively (von Gersdorff, 1997). Table 2.1 reports the distribution of the Bolivida as a
proportion of the total monthly per capita household expenditure estimated separately for urban and rural
households. On average, the Bolivida income represents 28 percent of the total household expenditure of
rural families (ranging from 4 to 100 percent across the household expenditure distribution), and 7 percent
of the total monthly household expenditure of urban families (ranging from 1 to 64 percent across the akin
distribution). The Bolivida, therefore, is a large program as far as the amount of money transfered to the
households. The Bolivida is paid in person upon presentation of one’s national identification card, which
1The government targeted the elderly as they have traditionally been one of the most unprotected and vulnerable segments
of the population: close to 79 percent of Bolivians are not covered by the social security system because of the existence of high
levels of informality in the labor market.
2This universal pension program was originally introduced under the name of Bonosol and, responding to political interests,
changed names several times over time from Bonosol to Bolivida to Renta Dignidad (for a discussion of its evolution see Muller
(2009)). In this paper, I refer to it as Bolivida as this was the name used for the program during the time of my analysis.
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verifies that the person is at least 65 years of age. The benefit can be cashed out in any of the many
accredited payment centers located across the country.
Although the eligibility rule and payment procedure is straightforward, the effective coverage and out-
reach of the Bolivida during the time of my analysis was very low. A large proportion of eligible elders did
not cash out this pension income. Panel A in Table 2.2, presents estimates of the portion of the eligible
elders participating in the program in rural and urban areas. On average, only 70.62 percent of eligible
elders benefit from this source of income. Given that rural elders may have higher time and money costs of
accessing the payment centers, more urban elders tend to use the Bolivida benefit than rural elders (72.41
percent versus 69.07 percent). The large difference between actual and potential beneficiaries is potentially
problematic for my analysis and, therefore, it is useful to examine administrative data to investigate further
why so many eligible people are not benefiting from the program. Administrative data from the implement-
ing Ministry (SPVS, 2002) suggest that the two main reasons preventing eligible members from becoming
recipients are, by far, irregularities and deficiencies in the national identification documentation system (57
percent of non-recipients) and distance to financial centers (27 percent of non-recipients).3 Figure 2.2, in the
Appendix, shows Bolivida take-up rates over time. By 2007, take-up rates had substantially increased to
reach 91 percent of eligible elders. This is consistent with the existence of a large information campaign by
the government to spread the program benefits, and also with the existence of social diffusion of information,
wherein information about the benefits is diffused at the private level through social networks. Interestingly,
the figure also shows a big jump in take-up rates from 2004-05. This is consistent with the introduction of a
large campaign by the government to increase access to national identification cards by citizens in the onset
of a national election — many government supporters had until then remained largely undocumented.
Even though holding a valid identification card and distance to financial centers seem to be the only
constraints impeding elders from benefiting from the Bolivida, it is useful to examine whether some specific
elder or household attributes might be correlated with Bolivida receipt.4 Table 2.3 reports the OLS estimates
on the probability of receiving the Bolivida as a function of several characteristics of the elders and their
households for the sample of eligible elders in my data. Elder characteristics include gender, urban status,
indigenous status, years of education, and indicators for whether the elder contributes to the social security,
is head of the household, and is literate. Household characteristics include household size, number of eligible
members in the household, indicators for whether the household has access to electricity and landline phone
service, and household composition indicators. All of the regressions include also a third order polynomial
3Administrative information available corresponded to averages for 2003-2006. Irregularities and deficiencies in the personal
identification documentation refer to misspelling of names, duplicity of the card and, lack of identification documentation.
4The determinants of access to identification cards by citizens are extensively studied in Chapter 1.
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expansion in the age of the oldest person in the household and have standard errors adjusted for complex
survey design. As expected, given that the targeting of beneficiaries is exclusively based on the age of the
elder, these variables are not jointly significant predictors of Bolivida receipt (joint p-value 0.37). Yet, several
of these variables (head of household, rural status, household size, and number of elders in the household)
are individually significant at the 10 percent level. In all the following analysis, therefore, I will be including
all of these covariates as control variables.
Data and subpopulation of analysis
The data for this study come from a nationally representative multi-purpose household survey conducted
by the Bolivian National Institute of Statistics in 2001 as part of the Living Standards Measurement Study
program administered by the World Bank. The survey includes a comprehensive socioeconomic module,
Bolivida receipt information, data on children’s labor market participation and number of hours worked,
school attendance, and detailed information on direct school expenditures for each child in the household
reporting attending school on a regular basis. As is typical for multi-purpose household surveys, the Bolivian
survey uses a two-stage stratified sampling design. The sampling frame for the primary sampling units is the
list of Census enumeration areas and the one for the secondary sampling units consists of a list of households.
Geographical regions and population agglomeration are used for stratification. The proportion of households
classified as poor and the average consumption expenditure are used for the random selection of households
using probability proportional to size sampling.
The subpopulation of analysis is restricted to school-age children (7 to 17 years old) who live with an elder
who is between the ages of 60 to 69 (Bolivida eligibility age is 65). Of the 5,845 households interviewed,
approximately 57 percent of them consist of three generations, and 39 percent of these three-generation
households have both at least one school-age child and an elder in the age-range considered. I exclude from
the analysis all households that do not have at least one member in the agricultural/labor market and those
whose total reported income is missing.5 Non-relatives and domestic workers living in the household are
also excluded. My final sample comprises 1,172 school-age children and 816 elders distributed across 657
households.
Table 2.4 presents the summary statistics for the school-age children in my sample and their households
broken down by receipt and eligibility status of the elder.6 In column (1), I present means and proportions
5There are a total of 61 children that live in households that do not have any member in the agricultural or labor market and
those whose total reported income is missing (5.20% of the sample). The main results in this paper do not change substantially
if I include these children in the sample.
6Ideally, I would have liked to presents these estimates dividing the sample by low and high level assets households. Due
to the small sample size, however, I am not able to do so because I do not have enough variation within all population strata
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for children in households with an eligible elderly person in the age range of 65 to 69; column (2) has the
means and proportions for children in households with a near-eligible elderly person in the age range of 60
to 64; column (3) has the means and proportions for children in households with an eligible elderly person
in the age range of 65 to 69 who benefited from the Bolivida; and in column (4) I present the means and
proportions for those children in households with an eligible elderly person in the age range of 65 to 69 who
did not benefit from the Bolivida.
Panel A presents the background characteristics of the children in my sample. Of the 1,172 school-age
children, 575 live in households with an eligible member, and 597 live in households with a near-eligible
member. Among children in households with an eligible elderly person, half are girls, 89 percent are enrolled
in school, 87 percent attend school on a regular basis, 38 percent are active in child labor (including wage
employment, self employment, and work in the family farm), and 9 percent are active in child labor without
attending school. Children in households with an eligible elderly person work on average 24.5 hours a week
(conditional on working), have parents with only 6 years of education, and spend BS 61 per month in
direct schooling expenditures (approximately USD 9.24). The characteristics of the children in households
with a member near eligibility are quite similar and none of the differences in means and proportions along
these characteristics are statistically significant at standard levels, except for school enrollment, attendance,
and child labor. The background characteristics of children across receipt status are also very similar to
those estimated across eligibility status. Among beneficiary children, 47 percent are girls, 88 percent are
enrolled in school, 87 percent attend school on a regular basis, 40 percent are active in child labor, and 10
percent are active in child labor without attending school. Beneficiary children work on average 26.6 hours
a week, have parents with 6 years of education, and spend BS 75 per month in direct schooling expenditures
(approximately USD 11.21). Overall, children in households with an eligible elderly person who did not
benefit from the Bolivida have on average a lower probability of attending school, and a higher probability
of participating in the labor market than those in households with an elder that did benefit from the Bolivida.
However, none of the children’s characteristics differences in means and proportions across receipt status are
statistically significant at standard levels.
Panel B presents the household characteristics of the children in my sample. Households with at least one
eligible member have on average 6 members, 2.5 school-age children, and a total household income excluding
the Bolivida of BS 1,995 (approximately USD 302). Further, the eligible person in the household has on
average 3 years of education. Overall, eligible households are not too different from near-eligible households.
Non-eligible households, however, are slightly larger and have elders with slightly lower levels of education,
to compute the variance of the estimates.
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but none of these differences are statistically significant at standard levels. Household characteristics across
receipt status also follow very similar patterns. Households with at least one beneficiary member have on
average 6 members, 2.2 school-age children, a total household income excluding the Bolivida of BS 2,100
(approximately USD 318), and a beneficiary person with slightly more than 3 years of education. Although
beneficiary households seem to be somehow better-off than non-beneficiary household along these dimensions,
none of the differences in means across these characteristics is statistically significant at standard levels.
Given the low take-up rates of the Bolivida during my year of analysis, a natural question that arises
in this setting is how children in households with no eligible elders differ from those in households with an
eligible elder that did not benefit from the program. This can be assessed by looking at columns (2) and
(4). On average, children in households with no eligible elders are slightly older, have higher probability of
being boys, and have parents with slightly less education. Further, children in households with no eligible
elders have lower probability of being enrolled or attending school (although their schooling expenditures
are slightly larger), have a larger probability of participating in the labor market, and work slightly more
hours than children in households with an eligible elder that did not benefit from the program. Yet, most of
these differences are marginal and none of them is significant at standard levels, except for mother’s years
of education which is significant at the 5 percent. In addition, households with no eligible elders are slightly
smaller in size, marginally poorer, and have soon-to-be elders that are slightly more educated as compared
to households with an eligible elder that did not benefit from the program. Again, however, none of these
differences are significant at the 5 percent level.
Empirical methodology
I am interested in studying the causal effect of unconditional cash transfer programs on children’s time
allocation decisions by taking advantage of the exogenous variation in income that the Bolivida program
introduced. However, as explained in the previous section, a simple comparison of time allocation decisions
of children by households who live and do not live with a Bolivida recipient is likely to provide a biased
estimate of this effect. In particular, because pensioners are not randomly distributed across households
and program take-up is far from universal, the comparison of children in households with pensioners to
those with no pensioners raises two concerns.7 First, beneficiary households may differ systematically from
non-beneficiary households. By construction, beneficiary households have on average older members than
non-beneficiary households and are, therefore, more likely to contain multiple generations. Further, the
presence of an elder in the household may influence children’s time allocation decisions in many different
7Table 2.2 shows that a large proportion of eligible elders are not benefiting from the Bolivida.
38
ways. The second concern relates to the fact that take-up of the pension may be an endogenous household
decision within the reduced-form children’s time allocation regression model I propose for the analysis.
This is problematic for my analysis to the extent that, if the decision to obtain the benefit responds to a
non-random process, it might introduce bias and inconsistency to my estimates.
To overcome differences between beneficiary and non-beneficiary households, I take advantage of the fact
that the probability of receiving the pension changes discontinuously at the eligibility age. In particular, I
identify the effects of the Bolivida on children’s time allocation decisions under a fuzzy regression discon-
tinuity design by limiting my sample to children in households with an eligible elderly person between the
ages of 60 to 69 and directly control for the presence of an elder in the age range of 65 to 69. Restricting my
sample in this manner implies that the effect of the Bolivida is identified by comparing children in households
with an eligible elderly person (65 to 69) to those in households with a near-eligible elderly person (60 to
64). An obvious concern in this approach, however, is that the Bolivida indicator may capture age trends
in addition to the effect of pension income on children’s human capital investments. To address this issue,
I include a polynomial expansion in the age of the oldest person in the household in each of the parametric
regression models considered, wherein changes in children’s time allocation decisions caused by the Bolivida
are captured by the eligibility indicator.8
To address the problem of potential endogenous pension take-up, I use two different approaches. First,
I focus on age eligibility rather than on actual take-up. This allows me to estimate intent-to-treat (ITT)
effects of the program or the effects of the Bolivida on the entire targeted population. Second, I estimate the
effects of the program on the subpopulation of beneficiary elders by exploiting the instrumental variables
connection to the fuzzy regression discontinuity design. Specifically, I estimate average treatment effects on
the treated (TOT) by using eligibility as an instrumental variable for Bolivida receipt (Angrist, Imbens, and
Rubin (1993) and Imbens and Angrist (1994)).
The reduced-form regression model I use to estimate the average intent-to-treat effects of the Bolivida
on time allocation decisions for child i, living in household h, is the following:
yih = α+ θEligibleh + ϑ(Eligibleh ∗Ruralh) + βRuralh + f(Xh) + ξih (2.1)
where y is a scalar of four alternative measures of time allocation decisions: (i) an indicator for whether
the child is involved in paid or unpaid market or farm work; (ii) total number of hours per week that child
spends working in that activity (in logs); (iii) an indicator for whether the child attends school; and (iv)
aggregate direct schooling expenditures (in logs), which includes enrollment fees, school fees, transportation,
8A third order polynomial is chosen because with more fine data cuts higher order terms drop out.
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uniforms, textbooks, school supplies, contributions to parent-teacher associations, contributions for top-ups
to teachers’ salaries, and contributions to improve school’s infrastructure; Eligibleh is an indicator for the
presence of an eligible member in the household; Ruralh is an indicator of whether the household is rural;
f(.) is a linear function which includes a third order polynomial expansion in the age of the oldest person
in the household and a dummy for whether the child is a boy; and ξih is a normally distributed error
disturbance independently and identically distributed over i and h, and clustered at the census enumeration
area. I cluster standard errors at the census enumeration area to allow for all unobserved variables that vary
across children and over households to be correlated over census enumeration areas.
To estimate the treatment-on-the-treated effect of the Bolivida on children’s time allocation decisions, I
use a two-step estimation approach. In a first step, I estimate a non-linear reduced-form regression model for
receipt as a function of eligibility. In a second step, I predict the non-linear fits for receipt. In a third step,
I use the predicted non-linear fits as instrument for program receipt in the following reduced-form model of
children’s time allocation decisions, which I estimate using instrumental variables:9
yih = pi + η( ̂Bolividah) + φ( ̂Bolividah ∗Ruralh) + δRuralh + g(Xh) + υih (2.2)
where Bolividah is an indicator for program receipt; g(.) is a linear function which includes a third order
polynomial expansion in the age of the oldest person in the household and an indicator for whether the child
is a boy; υih is a normally distributed error disturbance independently and identically distributed over i and
h and clustered at the census enumeration area. The intuition behind the use of this approach is to estimate
the effect of the Bolivida on children’s time allocation decisions by using only that part of the variance in
the receipt variable for which the exclusion restriction holds.
Besides the main underlying identifying assumption that families are not able to manipulate elders’ age
to strategically locate themselves around the eligibility age, three more conditions need to hold for ϑ, θ,
φ, and η to be informative about the causal effects of the Bolivida on children’ time allocation decisions.
First, elder’s age should not be correlated with eligibility for other programs that simultaneously might have
affected children’s human capital investments. At the time of my analysis, there were not any programs
implemented in Bolivia on a national scale that focused on elders or children’s human capital investments.
Consequently, overlapping in eligibility rules should not be a source of bias. Second, households must not
have engaged in formal or informal ex-ante borrowing as a result of potential anticipation of the pension
income, which might have affected children’s time allocation decisions. As explained in Section 2, the
Bolivida program was not conceived as a pro-poor policy per se but rather as a politicized benefit. A year
9For details on this procedure, see Angrist and Pischke (2009), pp. 190-92.
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after its creation, in 1997, the continuation and fiscal sustainability of the program were highly uncertain
(Gamboa-Rivera, 2006). Indeed, the Bolivida financial problems were so serious that the program was put on
hold for a couple of years until 2001, the year of my analysis, because payments were financially untenable.
All of these problems contributed to the erosion of the credibility in the program and, therefore, it is unlikely
that households anticipated this source of income.
Third, household structure must be uncorrelated with program eligibility. There are two mechanisms
that would violate this assumption. First, households might have anticipated the program income and, there-
fore, adjusted their household composition accordingly (endogenous household composition). For instance,
households might have welcomed elder relatives as a result of eligibility for the program. Second, households
might have anticipated the program income and adjusted their migration patterns accordingly (endogenous
migration). For instance, the increased expected income due to the Bolivida might have been used by the
families to ask for informal loans to pay for the cost associated with moving-in pensioners. Given the pre-
viously exposed program credibility argument, it is highly unlikely that any of these mechanisms occurred
in my setting. To test for this formally, however, I present two empirical tests in Section 2 to investigate
whether endogenous household composition might be a threat to the validity of my identification strategies.
Main findings
The results from estimating Equations 2.1 and 2.2 for labor supply responses of children are presented in
Table 2.5. I split the sample by level of household assets and perform all estimations separately for the
subsample of children who live in households with relatively low levels of assets and those with relatively
high levels of assets. The reason why I split the sample in this way is because several previous studies
have shown that household assets are an important determinant of child labor and school attendance. For
instance, some studies have shown that child labor increases with the amount of assets possessed by the
household up to a certain level (e.g. Bhalotra and Heady (2003), Dumas (2007), Del Carpio (2008), Basu,
Das, and Dutta (2010), Menon (2010)). To classify children in households with low and high levels of assets,
I construct an asset index using principal component analysis which includes several measures of household
assets including land ownership, dwelling ownership, access to water and sanitation, access to electricity and
landphone, kitchen a separate room, and dwelling all high quality materials (e.g. Filmer and Pritchett, 1998).
The labor supply responses of children are measured by two variables: an indicator for whether the child is
involved in paid or unpaid market or farm work (Panel A), and the total number of hours per week that the
child spends performing that activity (Panel B). In columns (1) to (4), I present the Bolivida effect for the
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subsample of children living in households with relatively low levels of assets (≤ 25 percentile of the asset
index distribution). In columns (5) to (8), I present the Bolivida effect for the subsample of children living in
households with high levels of assets (> 25 percentile of the asset index distribution). Each pair of columns
presents the intent-to-treat estimates (ITT) and the analogous treatment-on-the-treated effects (TOT) of
the program. All estimates are obtained using OLS methods. The treatment-on-the-treated estimates are
estimated using the two-stage procedure described in Section 2.
Although most of the coefficients are imprecisely estimated, rural households with relatively low levels
of assets seem to have responded to the Bolivida by increasing children’s participation in farming and
agricultural activities. In particular, the Bolivida is associated with an increase in the probability that
children in rural areas from households with relatively low levels of assets are involved in child labor. Children
in rural households with low levels of assets who live with an eligible person are 5.53 percentage points (ITT)
more likely to be engaged in child labor as compared to those who live with a near-eligible person. The
F-statistic for the null that Ho: Bolivida+Bolivida*Rural=0 is 3.52 (p-value=0.08). In contrast, the Bolivida
is associated with a large reduction in the probability that children in urban areas from households with
relatively low levels of assets are involved in child labor (-32.97 percentage points, ITT).
Moreover, the Bolivida is not associated with an increase in the number of hours rural children from house-
holds with relatively low levels spend working. The F-statistic for the null that Ho: Bolivida+Bolivida*Rural=0
is 0.04 (p-value=0.84). Yet, the Bolivida is associated with a substantive reduction in the number of hours
urban children from households with relatively low levels of assets spend working. Children from urban
households with relatively low levels of assets and who live with an eligible person spend on average 146.45
percent (ITT) less hours working compared to those who live with a near eligible person.
Lastly, the Bolivida is not associated with significant changes in child labor patterns (both probability
of working and number of hours spent working) among children living in relatively richer households as
measured by asset levels. Yet, to the extent that child labor has been shown to significantly affect school
achievement (Bezerra, Kassouf, and Arends-Kuenning, 2009), the significant increase in child labor among
rural children might potentially have pervasive effects among these children.
The results from estimating Equations 2.1 and 2.2 for human capital investments are summarized in Table
2.6. The Table presents OLS estimates. Children’s human capital investments are measured by two variables:
an indicator for whether the child attends school on a regular basis (Panel A), and the total aggregate direct
schooling expenditures in logs (Panel B). In columns (1) to (4), I present the effects of the Bolivida for the
subsample of children in households with relatively low levels of assets. In columns (5) to (8), I present the
Bolivida effects for the subsample of children in households with relatively high levels of assets. Each pair
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of columns presents the intent-to-treat estimates and the analogous treatment-on-the-treated effects of the
program.
The increase in the probability that rural children from households with relatively low levels of assets
work as a result of the Bolivida does not necessarily translate into reductions in the probability that they
attend school. Indeed, school attendance among both urban and rural children is largely unaffected by
the Bolivida. Next, I examine whether the Bolivida might have affected human capital investments at the
intensive margin. The data allow exploring whether direct schooling expenditures might have been affected
by the program and, if so, the specific components affected. Panel B, in Table 2.6, presents the effects of
the Bolivida on an aggregated measure of direct schooling expenditures (in logs). This aggregated measure
includes annual enrollment fees, monthly school fees, transportation-to-school, uniforms, textbooks and
school supplies, contributions to parent-teacher associations, contributions for top-ups to teachers’ salaries,
and contributions to improve school’s infrastructure. The ITT effects are estimated using OLS, in Equation
2.1, including now as an additional covariate the mean of direct schooling expenditures in logs (at the census
enumeration area level) to control for differences across regions in school choice and income levels. The
TOT effects are estimated using the same two-stage least squares procedure described in Section 2 but now
adding as an additional control the mean of direct schooling expenditures (in logs) at the level of census
enumeration area. Overall, the Bolivida is not associated with significant changes in household’s direct
schooling expenditures for neither children in households with relatively low levels of assets nor those in
households with relatively high levels of assets.
Overall the TOT estimates are not significant, although the ITT estimates are sometimes significant.
In this setting, the ITT estimates give the average impact of being assigned the option of cashing out the
Bolivida while the TOT estimates give the average impact of actually receiving the Bolivida. To the extent
that participation in any social program is at the end voluntary, selective take-up is a well-known source of
bias in any impact evaluation of this kind. The gold standard for identifying causal impacts in a setting
such as the one studied in this paper is to use the program assignment rule as an instrumental variable for
treatment status. However, households almost certainly base their choices on things that are unobservable
to the researcher. To the extent that Bolivida receipt might respond to unobservable factors that might
be correlated with factors that simultaneous affect children’s human capital investments, I believe that the
reported ITT estimates are the most appropriate measure of causal impacts in this setting. Yet, just which
one of the two estimates might be better to look at would eventually depend on what the researcher wants
to learn from the impact evaluation.
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Robustness checks
Endogenous household composition
The essential difficulty for my identification strategy is whether controlling for the presence of an eligible per-
son in the household adequately controls for the differences between recipient and non-recipient households.
More specifically, an important problem that arises in this setting is whether the presence of an eligible
person in the household is exogenous in the reduced-form regression model I use in this paper. There are
two mechanisms that would violate this assumption. First, households might have anticipated the program’s
income and adjusted their household composition accordingly (endogenous household composition). Second,
households might have anticipated the program’s income and adjusted their migration behavior accordingly
(endogenous migration). Any of these two mechanisms would generate a correlation between eligibility and
household composition and invalidate my results.
A test for whether the Bolivida led to migration or adjustments in household structure is to look at
whether there exists a systematic correlation between eligibility, household composition, and migration
patterns of the elder members in the household. The results of this exercise are presented in Table 2.7. In
Panel A, I report the estimates for the subsample of children in households with relatively low levels of assets.
In Panel B, I report the estimates for the subsample of children in households with relatively high levels of
assets. Columns (1) to (2) present the correlations between Bolivida eligibility/receipt and the probability
of the elder having moved-in to the household in the last five years. All coefficients are estimated using OLS
methods. Columns (3) to (4) present the correlations between Bolivida eligibility/receipt and household size
as measured by the total number of members in the household. These coefficients are estimated using OLS.
The Bolivida is neither statistically significant associated with the probability that the elder in the household
moved-in in the last five years nor with household size. Therefore, the assumption that any observed changes
in household composition across Bolivida status are random seems a reasonable assumption in my setting.
Further, as during the time of my analysis the Bolivida had just resumed after several years on hold, it is
highly unlikely that families might have welcomed-in elders as a result of anticipating the programs’s income.
Can unobserved differences between eligible and near-eligible households
explain the results?
One way to test for unobserved confounders, in my setting, is to estimate the effect of the presence of a
person aged 65 to 69 in the household on my four outcomes of interest in years when Bolivida was not
offered. This exercise of out-of-sample validation allows me to assess whether omitted variables might be
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biasing my main results. Table 2.8 reports the intent-to-treat coefficients of the Bolivida on my four outcomes
of interest estimated in a baseline sample. This baseline sample comprises two cross sectional household
surveys collected in 1999 and 2000 (i.e. two years before my analysis and when the program was not paying
any benefits). The baseline subpopulation of analysis includes all school-age children (7 to 17 years old) who
live with an elder who is between the ages of 60 to 69. In columns (1) to (4), I present the estimates on child
labor for the subsample of children living in households with relatively low levels of assets. In columns (5) to
(8), I present the estimates on child labor for the subsample of children living in households with relatively
high levels of assets.
The results show that the presence of a person aged 65 to 69 in the household in the baseline sample
has no significant effect on both the probability that a child is engaged in paid or unpaid child labor and
the number of hours they spend working. Therefore, while I cannot completely rule out the possibility that
unobserved confounders might be biasing my results, these estimates are reassuring and suggest that the
previously estimated Bolivida effects are not only the result of omitted variables in my model.
Interpretation of findings
There are several reasons why the Bolivida might affect children’s time allocation decisions. First, the
unconstrained human capital model of a single household decision-maker might be incorrect. In particular,
it is possible that households use more sophisticated household models of decision making, which allow
for changes in bargaining power when a person becomes eligible to receive the Bolivida.10 However, if
households are not credit or liquidity constrained, program income should not be translating into increases
in child labor. In this sense, the story of the existence of more sophisticated decision-making household
models is only consistent with my findings if some market imperfections are allowed to come into play.
Second, the assumption that households are forward-looking and rational might be incorrect. If parents
are myopic, then the findings of this paper would reveal a pure income effect without necessarily implying
that households are liquidity constrained. Although, this pure income effect might seem counterintuitive, it
is indeed consistent with the idea of the existence of an inverted-U relationship between household wealth
and child labor (e.g. Bhalotra and Heady (2003), Dumas (2007), Del Carpio (2008), Basu, Das, and Dutta
(2010), Menon (2010)).
Now, there is one important reason why child labor in the rural areas may increase as a result of the
Bolivida if households are liquidity constrained. Mart´ınez (2004) presents strong evidence that an important
10There is a large literature showing that giving income to household members increases their bargaining power (e.g. Manser
and Brown (1980), Lundberg, Startza, and Stillman (2003), Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003), Pollak (2005)).
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part of the Bolivida income was used towards productive investments assets among rural households. In
particular, he documents large increases in animal stock and expenditures on farming inputs when agri-
cultural households become eligible to benefit from the Bolivida. Moreover, he finds that these changes
in productive assets directly translated into increases in crop output and consumption of home produced
agricultural products. In this setting, therefore, the Bolivia might have triggered the demand for labor in
settings where labor markets are missing, where hired labor cannot easily be substituted for family labor
due to moral hazard problems, and where returns to experience from child labor are high. Consequently, the
Bolivida might be creating incentives for households to increase their children’s labor market participation
by indirectly increasing children’s relative productivity in the labor market and, therefore, increasing the
opportunity cost of leisure and schooling for children.
Concluding remarks
The two research designs I use in this paper suggest that the Bolivida led to a substantial reduction in the
probability that children in the urban areas from households with relatively low levels of assets were engaged
in child labor (-32.97 percentage points), and in the number of hours urban children from households with
relatively low levels of assets spend in farming and agricultural activities (-146.45 percent reduction in hours
worked). In contrast, the Bolivida led to an increase in the probability that children in the rural areas from
households with relatively low levels of assets were engaged in child labor (5.53 percentage points). The
changes in child labor as a result of the Bolivida, however, did not translate into changes in school attendance
among children. I discuss several reasons why the Bolivida might affect children’s time allocation decisions,
including the possibility that households engage in bargaining behavior, that households might be myopic
when making decisions regarding their children’s human capital investments, and that households might be
credit or liquidity constrained. Overall, my findings are most consistent with the existence of credit and
liquidity constraints among poor rural households and of the large income effect resulting from the Bolivida
among poor urban households. Yet, these results should be interpreted with caution to the extent that
some of these coefficients are imprecisely estimated. Larger samples might be needed in future research to
adequately study the impact of this program on children’s time allocation decisions. Further, although the
ITT estimates reported in this paper are sometimes significant, the TOT estimates are never significant
— overall, however, the ITT estimates seem to be the most appropriate measure of causal impacts of the
Bolivida in this setting because of the selective take-up of the program.
The findings of this paper reconcile with previous research on the effects of this program that finds
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that the Bolivida facilitated productive investments in the rural areas by relaxing liquidity and credited
constraints, which in turn boosted agricultural output and consumption of home-produced agricultural
products (Mart´ınez, 2004). This increase in productive investments among rural households seems to have
indirectly created incentives for agricultural households to engage their children in farming and agricultural
activities. These incentives seem to be particularly strong in settings where hired labor cannot easily be
substituted for family labor due to moral hazard problems, where returns to experience from farming are
high, specially if the child is expected to inherit the family farm, and where labor markets are missing.
There are several important policy implications of the findings of this paper. First, the benefits offered by
unconditional cash transfer programs might have unanticipated consequences. It has generally been assumed
that the benefits offered by these programs would lead to reductions in child labor among poor households
or at least leave it unaffected. The findings of this paper suggest that this might not necessarily be the case
when households are able to invest at least part of these benefits in productive assets. Second, most of the
literature on child labor argues that improving access to credit and reducing liquidity constraints might be
an effective policy to attack the problem of child labor in developing countries. My findings suggest that
if eradicating child labor is a policy priority, direct measures might have to be taken to ensure that credit
availability does not translate into increases in the demand for child labor among poor households.
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Chapter 2 Figures and Tables
Table 2.1: Bolivida as proportion of total monthly per capita household expen-
diture, Bolivia, 2001†
Rural Urban
Percentile Mean Share (%) Mean Share (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 30 100 112 64
5 81 87 219 35
10 140 66 378 19
25 194 41 631 13
50 321 26 1,099 7
75 529 16 1,991 4
90 930 9 3,568 2
95 1,437 5 5,554 1
99 2,230 4 8,465 1
Total 500 28 2,366 7
†
NOTE.- Mean refers to total monthly per capita household
expenditure (in BS) excluding the Bolivida income. The
Bolivida annual income has been converted to equal-amount
monthly payments for these estimations. Calculations include
complex survey design and are nationally representative.
Sample includes all households with at least one recipient.
Percentiles are based on total monthly per capita household
expenditure.
Table 2.2: Share of eligible group benefiting from the Bolivida, Bolivia, 2001†
Rural Urban Total
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Receipt status (%)
Share of eligible elders benefiting from the Bolivida 0.6907 0.7241 0.7062
(0.025) (0.027) (0.026)
Panel B: Identification card holder (%)
Share of eligible elders holding an ID card 0.8831 0.9142 0.8992
(0.043) (0.031) (0.026)
†
NOTE.- Standard deviations in parentheses. Estimates are nationally representative and have
been computed for the subpopulation of people with at least 65 years old. Estimates in Panel
A are computed using data for 2001, which is my year of analysis. In contrast, estimates in
Panel B are computed using a different wave of the household survey for year 2002, which
collected information on identification documentation status.
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Table 2.3: Relationship between Bolivida receipt, elder and household char-
acteristics, Bolivia, 2001†
Receipt SE
(1) (2)
Elder attributes:
Social security retirement benefit indicator -0.0255 (0.053)
Head of household indicator 0.1449*** (0.036)
Male indicator -0.0318 (0.030)
Rural indicator -0.0735*** (0.026)
Indigenous indicator -0.0064 (0.026)
Literacy indicator -0.0393 (0.030)
Years of education -0.0019 (0.004)
Household attributes:
Household size 0.0164** (0.007)
Number of eligible members in the household 0.1708*** (0.031)
Household access to electricity indicator 0.0292 (0.023)
Household has landline phone service indicator 0.0441 (0.036)
Household composition Yes -
Third order polynomial in age of oldest person in household Yes -
Observations 436 -
p-value of all listed variables 0.37 -
†
NOTE.- Estimates reported are OLS coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered
at the census enumeration area. Household composition covariates include the proportions of
members in the household that are in the age ranges 0-6, 7-18, 19-24, 25-64, and 65-94. None of
these proportions is statistically significant at the reported levels.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
* Significant at 10 percent.
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics across receipt and eligibility status, Bolivia,
2001†
Eligible Non Beneficiary Non
Eligible Beneficiary
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A : Children characteristics
Age (in years) 12.34 12.78 12.47 12.59
(0.17) (0.17) (0.26) (0.14)
Proportion of boys 0.50 0.56 0.53 0.53
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Proportion enrolled in school 0.89 0.80* 0.88 0.83
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Proportion attending school 0.87 0.79* 0.87 0.82
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Proportion working 0.38 0.47 0.40 0.43
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
Proportion working without attending school 0.09 0.17* 0.10 0.14
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Number of hours worked per week (conditional on working) 24.47 28.20 26.62 26.54
(1.95) (2.01) (2.84) (1.65)
Schooling expenditure (monthly, in Bs) 61.36 50.75 74.72 49.32*
(9.05) (9.64) (15.95) (6.91)
Father’s years of education 5.77 5.57 6.31 5.75
(0.39) (0.34) (0.50) (0.30)
Mother’s years of education 5.48 4.70 6.23 5.99‡
(0.40) (0.35) (0.52) (0.31)
Observations 575 597 351 224
Panel B : Household characteristics
Household size 6.14 6.27 6.00 6.28
(0.21) (0.30) (0.27) (0.24)
Number of school age children in household 2.47 2.58 2.22 2.63*
(0.12) (0.16) (0.13) (0.12)
Proportion of school age children in household 38.31 39.94 36.30 40.15*
(1.21) (1.16) (1.29) (1.03)
Eligible’s years of education 3.17 3.0932 3.33 3.06
(0.32) (0.30) (0.45) (0.24)
Total hhold income excl. Bolivida (monthly, Bs) 1,995 1,785 2,100 1,812
(178.35) (162.05) (259.01) (135.58)
Bolivida household income (monthly, Bs) 39.50 0.00* 74.03 0.00*
(3.41) (0.00) (3.13) (0.00)
Observations 331 326 234 97
† Statistics reported correspond to estimated means and proportions. All estimates weighted to be nationally
representative and corrected for clustered and stratified sampling design. Linearized standard errors in
parenthesis. Asterisks in column (2) correspond to a p<0.05 of the difference between children in households
with an eligible elderly person and those in households with a near-eligible elderly person. Asterisks in
column (4) correspond to a p<0.05 of the difference between beneficiary and non-beneficiary
children/households. ‡ in column (4) corresponds to a p<0.05 of the difference between non-eligible and
non-beneficiary children/households. The average number of people per household receiving the pension is
1.36. Per capita household income adjusted for equivalence scales is defined as in World Bank (2003): Adult
Equivalence Scales (AES)=1+0.7(adults-1)+0.5 children.
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Table 2.7: Eligibility, receipt, and household composition, Bolivia, 2001†
Probability that Logarithm of
household member in household size
age range 60-69 was
living somewhere else
in last 5 years
ITT TOT ITT TOT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Low level of assets (≤25 percentile)
Bolivida household 0.0054 -0.0417 -0.1115 -0.1665
(0.031) (0.065) (0.089) (0.199)
Observations 269 269 269 269
Panel B: High level of assets (>25 percentile)
Bolivida household 0.0107 -0.0453 -0.0086 -0.0387
(0.025) (0.061) (0.054) (0.058)
Observations 903 903 903 903
†
NOTE.- All coefficients are OLS estimates. Standard errors in parenthesis
clustered at the census enumeration area. All regressions weighted to correct
for sample design.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
* Significant at 10 percent.
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Figure 2.1: Historical changes in the amount of the benefit, Bolivia, 2001
Figure 2.2: Bolivida take-up rates over time (%), Bolivia, 2001
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Chapter 3
Bureaucratic delay, local-level
monitoring, and delivery of small
infrastructure projects: Evidence
from a field experiment in Bolivia
Introduction
Decentralization of public services to local governments and community participation in the monitoring of
the delivery is now regarded as the key to improved social service provision in developing countries.1 The idea
behind community participation in the monitoring of public service delivery is that community members are
the people who ultimately benefit from a successful program and, therefore, they are the ones with better
incentives to monitor, and should be given this responsibility (Stiglitz, 2002). The vision of community
participation in the monitoring of public services, and more generally of community-based and community-
driven development, is currently one of the cornerstones of the World Bank’s Comprehensive Development
Framework (Philip, Domelen, Ostrom, Ryan, Wakeman, Bebbington, Alkire, Esmail, and Polski 2001).2
Despite the enthusiasm for community-level monitoring, however, skeptics have misgivings about both
the basic precepts and the challenge of implementing such projects in practice. Summers (2011), for in-
stance, is concerned that local institutions promoted under community-level monitoring could undermine
democratically elected governments. Bardhan (2002), Gong (2002), and others suggest that the use of
grassroots participation in monitoring might promote locally based corruption and even facilitate organized
crime. Banerjee, Deaton, and Duflo (2004) and Banerjee, Banerji, Duflo, Glennerster, and Khemani (2010)
are instead concerned about the collective action problem inherent to any of these monitoring schemes.3
Most community-driven development interventions supported by aid organizations aim at improving ser-
vice delivery by enhancing the community’s capacity to act collectively to obtain higher quality services from
providers. Assessing whether services delivered with community involvement are more effective than those
1See, for instance, Foster and Rosenzweig (2001), Galasso and Ravallion (2005), and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006).
2The entire World Bank’s World Development Report, in 2004, also advocated for putting users of public services at the
center of the provision as the keystones for improved public service delivery (World Bank,, 2004).
3The collective action problem in this setting refers to the fact that monitoring is a public good and, therefore, is prone to
free-rider problems.
56
delivered involving none typically requires comparing community-driven services with centralized mecha-
nisms of service delivery. By now, there is a small empirical literature looking at whether community-driven
projects might be able to create more effective community infrastructure and improve welfare outcomes.
However, this literature, with few exceptions, does not establish causal links and is not able to say much
about the participatory elements that are responsible for improved intervention outcomes.4 Khwaja (2001),
for instance, evaluates community-driven projects in Pakistan by comparing a random sample of projects
with similar projects in the same village delivered with involved no community participation. He finds that
on average community-managed projects are better maintained than projects managed by the local gov-
ernment. Paxson and Schady (2002) find evidence that community involvement tends to improve access to
schooling. By using geographic variation in school infrastructure and health facilities expenditures by the
Peruvian social fund Foncodes, they find a positive relationship between the construction and renovation of
schools and school attendance, particularly among young children. Newman, Pradhan, Rawlings, Ridder,
Coa, and Evia (2002) use panel data on project beneficiaries and an encouragement to participate in these
projects to evaluate the provision of small-scale rural infrastructure projects in water and sanitation by the
Bolivian Social Fund. They find that community water systems constructed under this Fund improve access
to and quality of water only when combined with community-level training. King and Ozler (2000) evaluate
the impact of a school autonomy reform in Nicaragua on student performance. By comparing centrally and
non-centrally managed public schools, they find that decentralized school students perform better than those
in centrally managed schools. They suggest therefore that school effectiveness might be improved by decen-
tralizing some aspects of school management and operations. Jimenez and Paqueo (1996) look at whether
public schools that rely on local resources for a greater share of their financing in the Philippines are more
cost-effective than those under relatively more centralized funding. They find that schools which rely more
heavily on local sources, such as contributions from the local school board, municipal government, parent-
teacher associations and other sources are generally more efficient. In a related study, Jimenez and Sawada
(1999) investigate how community management of schools through the EDUCO program can affect educa-
tional outcomes in El Salvador. They find that decentralization of schooling responsibilities to communities
had significant positive effects in educational outcomes. Though not about community monitoring per se,
this literature unambiguously supports the idea that increasing community participation might importantly
enhance the delivery of public services.
Although these studies provide a very optimistic view of community participation on project effectiveness,
other studies provide more ambiguous evidence. Gugerty and Kremer (2000) evaluate the impact of a
4Most of this literature review is based on Mansuri and Rao (2004).
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randomly assigned participatory program, which provides agricultural inputs to women in Kenya. They
find that the program is ineffective at increasing agricultural output and that, on average, the costs of the
agricultural inputs are greater than any benefits the program might generate. Hoddinott, Adato, Besley,
and Haddad (2001) look instead at the relationship between community participation and public works
interventions using data on public works programs from South Africa. By using different measures of
community fractionalization as instruments for participation intensity, they find few significant effects in
any of the outcome variables they examine.
During the last couple of years, a small but growing experimental literature trying to solve the collec-
tive action problem inherent to monitoring schemes has also begun to appear. The results are again not
encouraging.5 One of the experiments focuses on addressing high absence rates among nurses assigned to
community health centers in India (Banerjee, Deaton, and Duflo, 2004). The experiment consisted in paying
a member of the community to randomly check (on a weekly basis) whether the nurse assigned to the health
center was present or not and, if not, to find out if she could be found somewhere around in the village. The
idea behind this experiment was to let villagers choose how to use the monitoring information the experiment
was generating. No attempt was made to impose an external reward system for the nurses based on the
monitoring information. At the end of the experiment, average absence rates in both treatment and control
health centers turned out to be almost identical. Community monitoring by itself was clearly not enough in
this setting to reduce absenteeism among health workers.
A second related study looks at the collective action problem within the context of the current flagship
program of universal primary education in India (Banerjee, Banerji, Duflo, Glennerster, and Khemani, 2010).
This flagship program organizes locally elected leaders and parents of children enrolled in public schools into
committees, and gives them power over resource allocation and management of school performance. In a
baseline survey, however, the authors find that parents and local leaders were not aware of the existence of
these committees and their potential for improving education. The experiment looks at three alternative
interventions aimed at encouraging participation of parents and local leaders on these committees. The
three interventions consisted of providing information, training community members in a new testing tool,
and training and organizing volunteers to hold remedial reading camps for illiterate children. The results
of the experiment are overall not encouraging. None of the interventions resulted in a significant impact on
community involvement, neither on teacher effort or learning outcomes. The authors suggest that although
communities care about education and are willing to do something to improve school quality, they face
important constraints in participating in the monitoring.
5A large number of studies present randomized experiments designed to address the problem of absence of teachers and
health providers in developing countries. Most of these studies are summarized in Banerjee and Duflo (2006).
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There is also a small experimental literature looking at the effects of increased public access to information
as a tool to improved public service delivery. This literature mainly has focused on assessing the extent to
which facilitating access to information by users might help capture and reduce corruption of public funds.
This literature is more encouraging and provides convincing evidence that higher levels of information and
accountability might be able to improve public service delivery by limiting opportunities for corruption at the
local level.6 Using a unique World Bank public expenditure tracking survey, Reinikka and Svensson (2004a)
document that for every dollar spent by the central government on schools, in Uganda, schools received only
20 cents on average. To explore ways in which to deal with this missing funds problem, the authors take
advantage of an unusual policy experiment to assess the effect of improved access to information on reducing
diversion of public funds (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004b). The policy experiment consists of a newspaper
campaign designed to boost the ability of schools and parents to monitor the handling of school funds from
the central to the local level. By using proximity to a newspaper outlet as an instrument for exposure to
the information campaign, they find that public access to information is a powerful deterrent of corrupt
behavior. The diversion of public funds from schools is reduced from 80 to 20 percent throughout the six
years of their study.
A related study presents a randomized experiment looking at the effectiveness of bottom-up monitoring
in reducing missing funds within village road projects in Indonesia (Olken, 2007). The experiment consists
of encouraging village members (through letters of invitation) to participate in accountability meetings
organized regularly by local leaders. The intervention proved successful at raising community participation
in the monitoring of village infrastructure projects. However, this increase in community participation did
not necessarily result in a significant reduction in overall missing expenditures. For public goods in which
incentives to monitor are weak, therefore, the author suggests that top-down approaches to monitoring may
be much more effective.
The previous literature identifies at least three necessary conditions for access to information to translate
into improved public service delivery. First, beneficiaries must greatly value the public service in question.
It has been suggested, for instance, that community participation might have not worked well to improve
education outcomes because its benefits are not tangible for the community. Second, local leaders must have
strong incentives to engage in monitoring activities to overcome the collective action problem. de Janvry,
Finan, and Sadoulet (2010), for instance, present evidence that local leaders‘ political incentives significantly
affect the educational outcomes of a decentralized conditional cash transfer program in Brazil. Third,
formal mechanisms of voicing complaints and punishing providers must be in place. If information and
6Rose-Ackerman (2005) provides a summary of much of the non-causal work on voice, transparency, and public service
delivery to date.
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accountability mechanisms are weak, as is common in many developing countries, beneficiaries will not have
incentives to engage in monitoring activities.
This paper examines bureaucratic delay within the allocation of small infrastructure projects by municipal
governments in Bolivia, and it presents a randomized field experiment designed to reduce bureaucratic delay
by promoting transparency and accountability among grassroots organizations. My experiment consists of
randomly providing district councils (or sub-municipal governments) with a tracking system, which provides
public officials and grassroots organizations real-time information on the processing of small infrastructure
projects requests by district councils. The objective of this intervention is twofold. First, is to facilitate
the involvement of grassroots organizations in the process of reviewing, tracking, and monitoring small
infrastructure projects allocations. Second, is to explicitly alter the probability of detecting inefficient
administrative practices by public officials within district councils and, therefore, to implicitly increase the
expected cost of engaging in such practices among public officials.
Bolivia presents an ideal setting in which to study this because of the radical and well-defined decen-
tralization reform process introduced in 1994. The Bolivian decentralization was linked to a far-reaching
law of popular participation, which dramatically empowered citizens by granting grassroots organizations
the right to participate in the planning, budgeting, and monitoring of public services. Further, the law
granted grassroots organizations the right to discipline municipal providers by giving them veto power over
municipal budgets and budget reports to ensure both that funds were well spent and that local elites did
not capture a disproportionate amount of resources. The Bolivian decentralization and the law of popular
participation have been widely studied and are considered the landmark for the design of decentralization
reforms in developing countries (Bardhan, 2002). In addition, Bolivia provides a unique opportunity in
which to empirically assess the effect of improved information on public service delivery because all of the
conditions previously discussed as necessary for effective local-level monitoring hold in this setting. First,
there is a very large demand for small local infrastructure projects, and their delivery is something citizens
greatly value. Moreover, its delivery is something very visible for the community as a whole and its benefits
immediately observable for the users (street lighting for instance). Second, the delivery of small infrastruc-
ture projects is pervasively used by local leaders, in this setting, as a political investment to make it to
the district council office. This creates huge personal incentives for local leaders to engage in monitoring
activities for the provision of these goods on behalf of their communities. Third, the decentralization and law
of popular participation introduced well established formal mechanisms to voice complaints and to discipline
municipal governments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the setting of the study. Section
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3 describes the experimental design, sampling, and randomization design. Section 4 presents the estimation
framework. Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 presents the experimental results. Section 7 discusses
the results and limitations of the study. Section 8 concludes.
Setting of the study
In 1994, as part of a global trend, the Bolivian government instituted an ambitious decentralization reform
from the central to the municipal level which, among several things, sought to improve government efficiency
in the delivery of public services. The decentralization process transferred the provision of public services
and infrastructure projects to the municipalities and was associated with massive shifts of public resources
from the central to the municipal governments.7 As part of the decentralization process, hundreds of
new municipalities were created and innovative institutions of local governance developed. To ensure that
the decentralization process did not translate into an entrenchment of elites, however, the law of popular
participation mandated the creation of oversight committees (comite´s de vigilancia). Oversight committees
are responsible for overseeing that at least 85 percent of the municipal public spending is used towards
infrastructure projects and social investments, and for re-balancing resources in favor of poorer districts.
Oversight committees operate by consensus, and give any single member veto power over the approval of
district development plans and budget reports. Depending on the size of the municipality, the oversight
committees have between three to ten members who are democratically elected among local leaders.
The Bolivian decentralization and the law of popular participation have been widely studied and are
considered the landmark for the design of decentralization reforms in developing countries (Bardhan, 2002).
The distribution of political power resulting from this reform has been associated with large increases in
the magnitude of public spending (Robinson (2008) and Faguet and Sanchez (2008)), the responsiveness
of public investments to local needs (Faguet, 2004), and the allocation of social spending towards smaller
and poorer municipalities (Faguet, 2006). Yet, the distribution of political power is also believed to have
had important implications for the allocation of resources at the local level. In particular, with greater
resources going to local governments, opportunities for local elites to use their influence to benefit from
a disproportionate share of public spending multiplied. The legislation of this reform assumed that local
participation in monitoring would act as a brake for misallocation of resources because local organizations
could stand for the grassroots and represent their interests. However, in a qualitative study, Kohl (2003)
suggests that the Bolivian decentralization and law of popular participation resulted in the entrenchment of
7The legal framework of these reforms was established by the Ley de Participacio´n Popular (Law of Popular Participation)
and the Ley de Descentralizacio´n Administrativa (Law of Administrative Decentralization).
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local elites and the decentralization of corruption rather than on the promotion of local development.
The city of El Alto, the setting for this study, is the third largest city in Bolivia by population size
and also one of the poorest in the country — 67 percent of its residents live below the poverty line. As
of 2009, the city was home to close to 0.93 million people, most of whom were first to third generation
migrants from the surrounding countryside and mining areas of the capital city of La Paz. El Alto is the
largest indigenous city in Latin America (82 percent of its residents are of indigenous descent) and it is well
known for retaining a strong indigenous cultural identity based on a deep-rooted sense of community (Lazar,
2007). The city of El Alto is highly organized and, for the majority of their residents, their relationship
with the municipal government is shaped by their membership in the neighborhood associations (Lazar,
2006). Neighborhood associations are the main interface between the municipal governments and the civil
society in the urban areas, and are the formal institutions through which to channel demands for small
infrastructure projects to the municipal governments.8 Neighborhood associations in the city of El Alto
are, by far, the strongest and most well organized in the country. They are also believed to be one of
the most effective grassroots organizations in the world (Romer, 2008). El Alto comprises more than 630
neighborhood associations, each of which is headed by a local leader (presidente) who is democratically
elected every two years among citizens residing in the neighborhood. The position of neighborhood president
is voluntary, unpaid, and normally carries high social recognition (Lazar, 2004). Neighborhood presidents
meet regularly with each other and their constituents, and their one major objective throughout the year is
to obtain small infrastructure projects for their neighborhoods. The city of El Alto has several accountability
mechanisms regarding local government performance for their residents. The main accountability mechanism
for neighborhood association members are the neighborhood accountability meetings (Asambleas Vecinales),
which are organized periodically by neighborhood presidents. Then there are also the district accountability
meetings (Asambleas distritales), which are jointly organized by neighborhood presidents belonging to a
district. Accountability meetings are opened to all citizens. Many different topics are openly discussed in
these meetings, including the delivery of small infrastructure projects for the neighborhoods and corruption
problems.
The city of El Alto is divided into 13 administrative districts or district councils (Subalcald´ıas), each of
whom is in charge of the provision of small infrastructure projects to the neighborhoods. District councils
are the lowest administrative level below the municipal government and function under the direction of
a district major or head of district council (Subalcalde), who is democratically elected every two years
8Neighborhood associations were not conceived as a result of the law of popular participation but rather have a long history
of union power and organization in the city of El Alto. Further, they have dominated the community life of this city for decades
(Blanes, 1998).
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among neighborhood presidents from the district. This creates huge political incentives for neighborhood
presidents to get actively engaged in local-level decision making concerning their neighborhoods of residence.
Traditionally, the capacity to obtain infrastructure projects for a neighborhood is associated with the ability
to perform well as head of the district council. District councils in the city of El Alto are classified as either
urban (8 out of the 13), peri-urban (3 out of the 13), or rural (2 out of the 13) based on their proximity
to the capital and adjacent city of La Paz. Each district council works with an annual budget assigned by
the Municipal Government of El Alto, based on population size. The use of this budget within each district
council is governed by the annual District Development Plan (Plan Operativo Anual), whose planning and
budgeting are jointly elaborated by the head of the district council, the neighborhood presidents, and the
members of the oversight committees.9 The district development plans set clear and specific goals for district
councils related to the provision of large infrastructure projects for the district and set aside a fraction of
the budget for small infrastructure projects (approximately 20 percent).
Small infrastructure projects are basic infrastructure projects whose total cost does not exceed BS 200,000
(USD 28,500). Table 3.1 presents a summary of the composition of small infrastructure projects I look at
in this paper. These include street-lighting, sewage treatment, culverts, trench digging, tree planting and
landscaping, construction of retention walls, groundworks, shallow excavations, etc. In contrast to large
infrastructure projects, the allocation of small infrastructure projects is not included in the district develop-
ment plans but rather determined at general assemblies (Asambleas Generales) throughout the year. The
main pre-requisite for a small infrastructure project to be submitted to the general assembly for consideration
is to successfully complete a pre-certification process at the district council. The pre-certification process
endorses a project for review at general assemblies and consists of a series of administrative steps involving
several revisions and inspections by public officials to the field. The different steps aimed by pre-certifying
projects is to make sure that the project is eligible (i.e. its total budget is less than BS 200,000), feasible
(i.e. the district council has the operating capacity to deliver such project in the proposed timeline), and
that it will benefit to a relatively large number of people in the district (though it is not exactly clear what
“large” means in this context — in practice, this usually is a discretionary decision made by of the head of
the district council).
The pre-certification process is officially initiated with the submission of a request letter to the head of
the district council by the president representing the citizens residing in the neighborhood. The letter is
manually registered in one of the many different incoming mailing notebooks that public officials working
within the district councils keep at one moment in time (libros de correspondencia). After the registration
9The elaboration of district development plans usually start in September of each year, and are endorsed and approved by
the municipal government by mid-to-end November.
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of the letter, this is sent to one of the many different Units within the district councils working in the
pre-certification of small infrastructure projects requests. The steps for pre-certification are specific to each
type of request and, as the pre-certification process moves forward, the tracking is recorded manually in
different incoming and outgoing mailing notebooks across the different Units. In general, mailing notebooks
are neither harmonized nor synchronized, which makes tracking very time consuming and complicated for
the neighborhood president. More often than not, these mailing notebooks have inaccurate, out of date,
and discrepant information across Units (Figure 3.1 show samples of these manual mailing notebooks).
Consequently, although neighborhood presidents have strong incentives to track their pre-certification project
requests, they face substantial constraints when participating in the monitoring. Not surprisingly, therefore,
neighborhood presidents have traditionally complained about the lack of reliable and transparent information
to track their requests within district councils.
This manual mailing system, and more generally the lack of formal mechanisms to enhance transparency
and local accountability, create great scope for inefficiency, exercise of discretion, and bureaucratic delay
within the district councils. In particular, as monitoring for the neighborhood president is so costly, public
officials have incentives to and usually do avoid taking care of their responsibilities by sending the letters
back and forth between Units (this is known as the ping-pong practice among public officials). Bloated
bureaucratic structures and inadequate human resource capacity at district councils are also common, which
significantly hamper efficiency within the delivery of public services. Further, political connections are
considered valuable assets to facilitate the provision of small infrastructure projects. Some neighborhood
associations are believed to have become increasingly politicized and respond more to self-interest of local
leaders rather than to the interests of the collectivity (Lazar, 2005). At least, this is what many believe, and
neighborhood associations are increasingly coming to the heart of this debate.
Design of the experiment
The experiment consisted of randomly providing district councils with a mailing tracking system (Chask-
inet), which promotes transparency and accountability by providing neighborhood associations and public
officials real-time information on the status of their small infrastructure projects pre-certification requests.10
The Chaskinet also allows users to access user-friendly summary statistics on pre-certification requests and
outcomes of the process by type of project. The idea of this experiment was to let neighborhood associations
choose how to use the information the Chaskinet was generating — no attempt was made to impose an
10The chaskis were agile and highly-trained runners that were dispatched along thousands of miles to deliver messages
throughout the Inca Empire, which extended throughout most of the present-day Bolivia.
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external reward/punishment system based on the information generated by the Chaskinet. The use of the
Chaskinet does not directly enable neighborhood associations to recognize inefficiencies and favoritisms, but
rather affects social control indirectly through three channels. First, the Chaskinet reduces the opportunity
cost of neighborhood presidents to finding out about the status of a pre-certification requests and, therefore,
it implicitly facilitates their involvement in the process of reviewing, tracking, and monitoring small infras-
tructure projects allocations. Second, the Chaskinet eliminates the possibility that public officials lie about
the location and status of a request and, therefore, it implicitly reduces the probability of them engaging
in ping-pong practices.11 Third, by explicitly altering the probability of detecting endogenous bureaucratic
delay, the Chaskinet increases the expected cost of engaging in inefficient and ping-pong practices among
public officials.
The Chaskinet is a simple and easy-to-use tracking software system. The system involves user-names
and passwords assigned to each public official working at the district council and, therefore, it can easily
provide real-time information on small infrastructure project allocations. Every time the district council
received a pre-certification request, it was introduced into the system, which assigned a sequential unique
tracking number to each of the requests. This tracking number was given to the neighborhood president
submitting the request and could be used to track the request throughout all of the pre-certification process
(i.e. analogous to any standard mailing tracking system in the US). Neighborhood presidents could access
the Chaskinet by either using a computer terminal specifically located at each of the district councils to
track the requests, or by approaching any public official at the district council to ask about the status of
their requests (i.e. by doing exactly the same thing they were doing before the Chaskinet came into effect).
To the extent that neighborhood presidents can access the Chaskinet using any of the above two procedures,
there should be no correlation between the ability to operate a computer and the use of the Chaskinet.12
Sampling and randomization design
The sampling for the study consists of a matched-pair design, with randomization occurring at the level of
district council. The primary sampling frame consisted of the list of the 11 urban and peri-urban district
councils in the city of El Alto. In a first step, I constituted five pairs of district councils by matching
district councils according to urban/peri-urban status and size as measured by the total budget for the 2009
district development plan. This led me to discard from the sampling frame the peri-urban district council,
11The reason why the Chaskinet eliminates the possibility that public officials lie about the location and status of a request
is because the system generates real-time information about the location and status of a request.
12The probability of public officials lying to neighborhood presidents about the status of a request is very unlikely because,
in practice, when requesting about the status of a request neighborhood presidents are standing up next to the public official
looking at his monitor.
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which looked most dissimilar in size to their counterparts. The reason why I chose a pair-matching sampling
design over simple random sampling is mainly because I wanted to assure balance on the budget covariate as
I believed inefficiencies might operate quite differently across distinct district council sizes. Randomization
was clustered at the district council level to avoid both anticipation effects and to make implementation
feasible. To this end, the main limitation of the study is the small power of the experiment arising from the
small number of clusters in my data.13
In a second step of the randomization, I randomly selected one district council within each pair to receive
an encouragement to participate in the experiment. The encouragement consisted of a visit to the district
council to present detailed information on the Chaskinet and its capabilities to the head of the district
council. At the end of the visit, the head of the district council was offered the opportunity to participate
in the experiment. In exchange for participation, the district council was offered free wiring installation and
network connection for all of the computers in the district council, and free training and support on the
use of the system. Further, the head of the district council was told that this was a one-time offer, that
the district was selected to participate by lottery, and that the Chaskinet was not going to be offered to
him or any other district at any other point in time in the future. Out of the five districts encouraged to
participate, only four accepted the offer. These four comprise all of the urban districts in El Alto except for
the peri-urban pair, which was excluded from the experiment.
The final sample is composed of a total of four treated and four control district councils. Table 3.2
displays a summary of the experimental design. For each of the four matched-pairs included in the study,
each pair of rows shows the total number of neighborhood associations in the district and the total number of
neighborhood associations actively engaged in the demand of pre-certification requests by Chaskinet status.
The distribution of neighborhood associations reported in this table confirm that overall there is good balance
in the number of neighborhood associations in each pair across Chaskinet status.
An important note to make here is that the introduction of the Chaskinet was announced to district
councils and neighborhood associations after development plans were finalized for that fiscal year. To that
end, the choice of what type of large infrastructure projects to fund during that fiscal year, as well as the
planned budget for small infrastructure projects, should all be viewed as exogenous with respect to the
experiment. Although treatment district councils were randomized according to the procedure described
above, it is useful to examine whether the Chaskinet status is ex-post correlated with some key district
council and neighborhood association characteristics. Table 3.3 explores this by reporting probit regression
marginal effects for the probability of being randomized into treatment as a function of 11 neighborhood
13Section 3 discusses how to I try to address the issue of low power in the estimation of the Chaskinet effects.
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association and 5 district council characteristics of interest. 14. As expected given the randomization, these
marginal effects are small and not jointly significant predictors of the Chaskinet at standard levels (joint
p-values 0.21, 0.17, and 0.10). However, the main experimental results remain largely unchanged when
adding these covariates as control variables (access to electricity and population size).
Estimation framework
The causal impact of the Chaskinet is estimated via ordinary least squares using the following regression
model for neighborhood association n, in district council d, submitting a pre-certification request for infras-
tructure project of type t :
yndt = β0 + β1Chaskinetd + κt + ξndt (3.1)
where y is either: (i) indicator for whether the pre-certification process was successfully completed, (ii)
number of days pre-certification requests take to get completed, or (iii) number of public officials involved
in the pre-certification completion process (this allows me to assess the prevalence of ping-pong practices
among public officials); Chaskinet is a treatment indicator at the district council level; κt is a vector of
19 type of infrastructure project fixed effects; and ξndt is a normally distributed error term independently
and identically distributed over n, d, and t, and clustered at the neighborhood association level. As all
district councils had the same probability of receiving the Chaskinet independently of the pair they were in,
the probability of receiving the Chaskinet is orthogonal to any matched-pair level or district council level
variable. To this end, controlling for strata is not necessary for the analysis to be consistent, but it may
help to reduce standard errors. In the subsequent analysis, I present different specifications of the above
regression model based on whether I respect the blocking structure of the sampling design or not.
As the number of clusters in my experiment is so small, an important issue in this setting is how to
preserve power when estimating the cluster-robust variance matrix. Kernan, Viscoli, Makuch, Brass, and
Horwitz (1999) and Wooldridge (2003) emphasize that relying on asymptotics for hypothesis testing when
the number of clusters is small can be very misleading as it tends to result in an over-rejection of the
null hypothesis. The finite-sample properties of the standard cluster-robust variance estimators have been
suggested to work reasonably well only when the number of clusters is larger than 50 (Bertrand, Duflo, and
Mullainathan (2004) and Kezdi (2005)). To preserve power, I use exact permutation inference to estimate
the p-values associated with the Chaskinet effects (e.g. Rosenbaum (2002), Kremer, Bloom, Bhushan,
14These variables were the variables used at the baseline to design the sample, and were specified before the experimental
data used here were collected.
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Clingingsmith, Hung, King, Loevinsohn, and Schwartz (2006), and Donald and Lang (2007)). Permutation
inference consists of estimating the p-values of the treatment effect by estimating a reference distribution of
the treatment effect by randomly permuting treatment status across district councils without replacement
under the assumption that the Chaskinet has no effect on the outcomes of interest. Appendix 3 describes in
more detail how I implemented this test to assess the Chaskinet effects. Yet, although permutation inference
is particularly useful when the treatment effect is small, this technique has low power relative to parametric
approaches when the true effect is large (as it does not put even a minimal structure on the error term).
The use of the Chaskinet affects bureaucratic delay by inducing a reduction in both ping-pong practices
among public officials and the exercise of discretion by the head of the district council. The experimental
design, however, does not directly enable me to separate these two effects. To gain some insights into the
mechanisms underlying the experimental data, however, I conduct focus groups to collect data on political
connections within districts. The idea of these data is to construct a measure of local elites at the neigh-
borhood president level. Local elites are broadly defined as locally-based individuals with disproportionate
access to social, political or economic power. These data on local elites are then used to test for whether
the effects of the Chaskinet vary across the level of political connections of the neighborhood association. If
bureaucratic delay and successful completion of a pre-certification request are merely explained by random
inefficiencies within district councils such as incompetence or ping-pong practices, I might expect to observe
that the Chaskinet has a similar effect across all neighborhood associations independently of their elite sta-
tus. I formally test for the possibility that the Chaskinet effects might vary systematically based on the level
of political connectedness by estimating the following equation via ordinary least squares:
yndt = β0 + β1(Chaskinetd ∗ Elitend) + β2Chaskinetd + β3Elitend + κt + ξndt (3.2)
where Elite is an elite indicator at the neighborhood president level.15 The parameter of interest in
this specification is β1, which provides an estimate of the average difference in the outcome variable in the
Chaskinet group from elite to non-elite groups relative to changes in the outcome variable in the control
group over the same groups. If the Chaskinet is having a favorable effect by preventing the exercise of
discretion within the allocation of small infrastructure projects as measured by the endorsement of pre-
certification requests, then I would expect to observe that the interaction effect between the Chaskinet and
the elite indicator is negative (i.e. β1 <0). In contrast, if the Chaskinet is not preventing the exercise
of discretion, then I would expect to observe that the interaction effect between the Chaskinet and the
elite indicator is zero or positive (i.e. β1 ≥0). Moreover, if the Chaskinet is having a favorable effect by
15Based on the qualitative data collected in the focus groups, neighborhood presidents were classified by the survey firm into
an elite and a non-elite group based on their political connections. I use this classification throughout my data analysis.
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reducing bureaucratic delay gaps between elites and non elites as measured by number of days and number
of public officials involved in the processing of requests, then I would expect to observe that the interaction
effect between the Chaskinet and the elite indicator is positive (i.e. β1 >0). Conversely, if the Chaskinet
is increasing bureaucratic delay gaps between elites and nonelites, then I would expect to observe that the
interaction effect between the Chaskinet and the elite indicator is zero or negative (i.e. β1 ≤0).
Data
The data for this study come from multiple sources and combines different methods of inquiry. The primary
data include the following: (i) pre-certification for small infrastructure projects data; and (ii) political
connections data. The secondary data include the following: (i) administrative data on public officials,
neighborhood presidents, and district development plans; and (ii) Census data on living standards at the
neighborhood association level. All data were collected between October 2009 and July 2010. The data
for the first month (October 2009) correspond to the baseline data and the data for the remaining months
(December 2010 to July 2010) correspond to the experimental data. The collection of the baseline data
started just after the completion of district development plans for the fiscal year of my analysis.
Pre-certification data for small infrastructure projects
The pre-certification requests data for the treatment districts were straightforward to compile and was di-
rectly collected from the Chaskinet. These data were collected by the field team on a weekly basis throughout
the implementation of the project. These data include the following: (i) district council number; (ii) unique
tracking number; (iii) name of the neighborhood association submitting the request; (iv) name of the neigh-
borhood president submitting the request; (v) type of infrastructure project; and (vi) tracking information
including date of pre-certification request submitted, completion date, outcome of the pre-certification re-
quest, and number of public officials needed to complete the pre-certification process. The data for the
control district councils and all of the baseline data were more challenging to compile, and it involved the
manual gathering of administrative information from the district council mailing records to construct a
dataset which closely overlapped that generated by the Chaskinet. The construction of this dataset involved
mainly two activities: digitally photographing all of the district council mailing notebooks page by page
(3,373 pictures), and transcribing all of the information into a digital format. The photographing of the
mailing books involved devising a unique photography tracking number, which allowed keeping track of all
of the pages to minimize errors during the transcription phase. To verify the quality of the data, external
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auditors performed several random checks. These random checks consisted of visits to the district councils
to verify that the information in the dataset was consistent with what was observed in the mailing books.16
Political connections data
The data on political connections were gathered using focus groups conducted between May and June of 2010.
Participants were randomly invited to participate and included neighborhood presidents, public officials, and
members of the oversight committees. To ensure high attendance rates, the focus groups were organized
in the late afternoon during weekdays, and at all times included at least 20 percent of the neighborhood
presidents, public officials, and members of the oversight committees. The discussion in the focus groups
was focused on collecting information about political support, political connections, and elite groups in the
districts. The focus groups encouraged participants to openly discuss the dynamics of small infrastructure
projects allocations, their perceptions about the pre-certification processes, and how political engagement
might facilitate the successful completion of a pre-certification request. At the end of the meetings, all
participants were invited to fill out a survey on their perceptions about their peers. For instance, they
were asked to name the neighborhood associations that they considered to have the best access to the
head of the district council, those they considered to have good leaders, those they considered to always
get things done, those they thought had the most political engagement, etc. As self-reports are subject to
bias, however, defining a clean measure of elites was not straightforward. To keep objectivity, I constructed
the measure of elites as follows. If all of the participants systematically reported that a neighborhood
president was well connected (by using a different subset of key perception questions), then I coded this
neighborhood president as belonging to the elite of the district. If only some of the participants reported
that a neighborhood president was well connected or no participant named the neighborhood association at
all, then I coded this neighborhood president as not belonging to the elites of the district.
Secondary data
I use four complementary data sources: (i) district development plans; (ii) census data at the neighborhood
association level; (iii) neighborhood presidents’ basic demographic information; and (iv) public officials basic
demographic characteristics. The information on district development plans was gathered for the stratifi-
cation of the sample. The information from the census at the neighborhood association level was collected
to explore whether basic living standard measures might correlate ex-post with Chaskinet assignment. This
16A two-step approach was used to conduct these random checks. In a first step, it was verified that a random subset of
observations from the dataset could be located in the district council mailing books (the photography tracking numbers were
critical throughout this process). In a second step, it was verified that a random subset of requests from the mailing books
could be located in the dataset.
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information was gathered by manually matching census enumeration areas with neighborhood associations
using cartographic information. The basic information about neighborhood presidents and public officials
was collected from administrative records to assess the extent to which some of these characteristics might
be correlated with any of the three outcome variables I look at in this paper.17 Neighborhood presidents’
background characteristics may affect small infrastructure projects delivery through two different channels
in addition to the political engagement channel. First, neighborhood presidents’ education might be an
important determinant of variation in monitoring capacity. Second, neighborhood presidents’ union power
experience might be an important determinant of the capacity to navigate the treacherous waters of bu-
reaucracy. Public officials’ characteristics may also affect small infrastructure projects delivery through two
related channels. First, public officials’ education and tenure might be an important determinant of variation
in competence and efficiency within the administrative procedures required to complete a pre-certification
request. Further, public officials’ tenure may affect the allocation of small infrastructure projects through
the building of social networks. That is, public officials with more tenure might have found their niches
and built social networks, which directly translate into the use of favoritism and exercise of discretion when
processing pre-certification requests.
Subpopulation of analysis
The subsample of projects considered in this paper is limited to those infrastructure projects with a budget
under BS 200,000 (approximately USD 28,500 — obras menores). These type of projects comprise roughly
24 percent of the district councils’ total budget. The reason why I am focusing on these projects is because
the allocation of large-scale infrastructure projects follows a very different administrative procedure, which
is relatively harder to manipulate by local neighborhood presidents.18 My sample is representative only of
those neighborhood associations having a president actively engaged in requesting pre-certification requests
for small infrastructure projects at the district councils. Table 3.2 shows that roughly 67 percent of the
neighborhood associations have a leader actively engaged in such requests (406 out of 607).
Descriptive statistics
The summary statistics of the data used in the study are presented in Table 3.4. Panel A reports the
average values for the three outcome variables considered in the analysis (ex-post data). Panels B, C, and
D present average values for baseline data to verify that basic observable characteristics of district councils
17During the time of the data collection, both neighborhood association and district councils’ leaders were serving an
overlapping two-year term.
18Table 3.1 presents a summary of the types of small infrastructure projects included in this study. I have excluded from
the subpopulation of analysis all mailing requests that did not relate to a pre-certification process request.
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and neighborhood associations were balanced across treatment status. The table shows that on average
only 19 percent of the pre-certification requests are successfully completed (i.e. get pre-approved by the
district council). This average is very similar across both treatment groups, and the difference in sample
means across treatment status is not significant at the 5 percent level. A typical pre-certification request
by a neighborhood president in the treatment group takes roughly 25 days to get processed compared to
27 days among those submitted by neighborhood presidents in the control group. The difference in sample
means across treatment status for days requests take to get processed is significant at the 5 percent level.
The average number of public officials involved in completing the administrative procedures required to
complete a pre-certification request is 6 (5.5 among neighborhood presidents in treated district councils and
6.22 among those in control district councils). Again, the difference in sample means across treatment status
for number of public officials involved in processing request is significant at the 5 percent level.
The average tenure (or years of union power experience) among neighborhood presidents in both treated
and control groups is 2 years, with roughly 9 years of school completed in both groups. About 22 percent of
neighborhood presidents both in treatment and control districts belong to elite groups. Roughly 7.5 percent
of the neighborhood presidents are women (10 percent in the treated group and 5 percent in the control
group). Although the percentage of neighborhood presidents that are women seems much higher in the
treated group, the difference in sample means is not significant at the 5 percent level. As for public officials,
the average tenure (or years of work at the district council) is 2 years (1.97 for public officials at treated
district councils and 2.19 for those at control district councils). Roughly 5 percent of them have attended
at least one year of college (5.21 percent among those in treatment district councils and 4.18 percent among
those in control district councils). About 33 percent of public officials are women (27 percent in treated
districts councils and 39 percent in control district councils). About 80 percent of public officials in both
treated and control groups hold a staff/permanent position, and on average public officials are around 37
years old (35 for those in treated districts and 38 for those in control groups). Overall, these statistics show
a good balance across treatment status of all of these basic characteristics of neighborhood presidents and
public officials. The difference in means is only significant at the 5 percent level for public official’s age.
The average number of people residing in a neighborhood is 1,500, though there is quite a lot of variation
across neighborhoods (1,881 on average in treated neighborhoods and 1,113 in control ones). At 7 percent,
the unemployment rate is very similar across both treated and control groups (7.59 percent in treated
neighborhoods and 6.80 in control ones). Neighborhood associations in the treated groups seem on average
to be slightly better off than those in the control group. About 83 percent of them have access to electricity
(in contrast to 78 percent in the control group), 51 percent have access to sanitary toilet facilities (in contrast
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to 48 percent in the control group), 14 percent have access to a landline phone (in contrast to 11 percent
in the control group), and 57 percent are below the national poverty line (in contrast to 60 percent in the
control group). None of the differences in sample means across these variables, however, is significant at the
5 percent level.
Discussion of experimental results
Overall effects
Table 3.5 presents the main results from the experiment. Each row presents a different dependent variable,
shown at the left. Column (1) reports the mean of the dependent variable in the control district councils.
The effect of the Chaskinet - that is, the coefficient β1 in Equation 3.1 - is presented in column (2). The
p-value from a test that the Chaskinet effect is zero is presented in column (3). Columns (4) and (5)
present again the Chaskinet effect and associated p-values for a specification of the model which does not
allow for type of project fixed effects. This alternative specification allows assessing the extent to which the
Chaskinet might have affected the composition of small infrastructure projects requested by neighborhood
associations. Columns (6) and (7) show the results of an alternative model which includes stratum (or
matched-pair) fixed effects instead. This specification of the model allows assessing whether respecting the
blocking structure of the design affects the Chaskinet estimates or not. Each pair of rows below the outcome
variables shows standard errors for the Chaskinet effect estimated separately based on whether the clustering
of the structure of the data was taken into consideration or not. The first row reports simple robust standard
errors. The second row instead reports robust standard errors clustered at the neighborhood association
level. All reported p-values are computed using permutation inference as described in Appendix 3.
The results in Table 3.5 show that the Chaskinet had a substantial negative effect on the number of
days pre-certification requests take to get completed. Column (2) shows that the Chaskinet resulted in
a 16.3 percentage points reduction in the number of days requests take to get completed. This effect is
statistically significant, with p-values of 0.000 and 0.003, based on whether the standard errors are allowed
to be correlated at the neighborhood association level or not. Also, this reduction corresponds to an average
reduction of 4.44 number of days requests take to get completed over the mean among the control group.
The estimates in other columns show that the Chaskinet has a similar magnitude and statistical significance
to that reported for the baseline specification (the reduction ranges from 15.3 to 17.2 percentage points or
4.17 to 4.69 number of days). Figure 3.2 shows the results graphically presenting for each treatment group
the estimated probability density function, where the function is estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel.
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These results show that the number of days pre-certification requests take to get completed at treated district
councils is lower at all percentiles of the distribution. The two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic testing
for for equality of both density functions is 0.2539 (p-value=0.000).
In practice, a reduction in the number of days requests take to get completed must arise by a reduction
in inefficient practices among public officials, which cause unnecessary bureaucratic delays for neighborhood
associations. One of such practices, as discussed in Section 3, is ping-pong behavior. The next panel in Table
3.5 shows that the Chaskinet had also a large negative effect on the number of public officials required to
complete a pre-certification request process. Column (2) shows that the Chaskinet resulted in a reduction
of 7.8 percentage points in the number of public officials required to complete a request. This reduction
corresponds to an average reduction of 0.49 number of public officials required to complete a pre-certification
request process. This effect is statistically significant, with p-values of 0.000, independently of whether
standard errors are clustered or not clustered at the neighborhood association level. This effect has a similar
magnitude and statistical significance across all of the specifications of the model reported in columns (4)
and (6) — the average reduction in the number of public officials in these alternative specifications ranges
from 8.3 to 9.2 percentage points (or 0.52 to 0.57 number of public officials). Figure 3.3 reports the results
graphically estimated also using an Epanechnikov kernel. The Figure shows that ping-pong practices are
on average less frequent in treated district councils across all of the percentiles of the distribution. The
two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic for equality of density functions is 0.1864 (p-value=0.000).
A natural question that arises in this setting then is whether the Chaskinet might have affected the
probability that a pre-certification request was successfully completed. Having a pre-certification request
successfully completed means getting it endorsed by the district council. This is a decision made by the
head of the district council based upon all of the information prepared by their subordinates. The last panel
in Table 3.5 shows the OLS estimates of a linear probability model, based in Equation 3.1, on an indicator
for whether the pre-certification process was successfully completed. In contrast to previous findings, the
estimates show that the Chaskinet had a negligible, and mostly statistically insignificant, positive effect on the
probability that a pre-certification request gets successfully completed. Column (2) shows that the Chaskinet
resulted in an increase of 1 percent in the probability of successfully completing a pre-certification request.
Yet, this effect is statistically insignificant, with p-values of 0.326 and 0.736, based on whether the standard
errors are clustered or not clustered. In columns (4) and (6), the Chaskinet effect is similar magnitude at
1.7 percent but only statistically significant when standard errors are not allowed to be correlated at the
neighborhood association level.
The Chaskinet effects do not vary substantially overall across the different specifications of the model.
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Estimates reported in columns (2) and (4) do not vary substantially. This suggests that although the
Chaskinet might have affected the composition of pre-certification requests submitted by neighborhood
associations, this change seems negligible. The Chaskinet effects also do not seem to depend importantly
either on whether I respect or do not respect the blocking structure of the experimental design. Estimates
reported in columns (2) and (6) do not vary substantially. This suggest that type of requests are well
balanced across type of requests within matched-pairs. Still, my preferred specification is the one that does
not explicitly control for matched-pair design as it allows for more variation for the identification of the
Chaskinet effects.
Elite groups
As discussed above, political connections are largely considered among neighborhood presidents as valuable
assets to facilitate the provision of small infrastructure projects. To examine this, I look at whether and
how the impacts of the Chaskinet differ across neighborhood associations headed by supporters and non
supporters of the head of the district council. Table 3.6 reports estimates from Equation 3.2, which tries
to get some insights into the relationship between the Chaskinet and the elite status of the neighborhood
president. This Table mirrors Table 3.5. Each pair of columns reports the coefficient of interest along with
the p-value from a test that the coefficient is zero. I report two alternative standard errors based on the level
of clustering used for the estimation: not clustered and clustered at the neighborhood association level. All
reported p-values are again computed using permutation inference as described in Appendix 3. In addition,
I present results for the three previous specifications based on the level of fixed effects included in the model:
(i) baseline specification; (ii) baseline specification not allowing for type of project fixed effects; and (iii)
stratum (or matched-pair) fixed effects.
The results in Table 3.6 show strong evidence that there is a positive correlation between the elite status
of a neighborhood president and the probability that his pre-certification requests get endorsed by the district
council. Neighborhood presidents perceived as local elites are on average 19 percent more likely to get their
pre-certification requests successfully completed as compared to those considered non-elites (columns (13)
to (18)). The magnitude of this coefficient is consistent across the different specifications of the model, and
it is always significant at the 1 percent level. Given that the mean probability of getting a pre-certification
request approved is only 22 percent, this effect is quite large in magnitude. However, neighborhood pres-
idents perceived as local elites cannot avoid ping-pong practices among public officials. Depending on the
specification, requests by elite neighborhood presidents take between 0.6 to 2.0 percent fewer public officials
to get completed as compared to those from non-elite neighborhood presidents (columns (7) to (12)). Simi-
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larly, neighborhood presidents perceived as local elites cannot avoid unnecessary bureaucratic delay within
the processing of their requests. Depending on the specification, elite neighborhood presidents requests take
between 2.8 to 4.2 percent fewer days to get processed as compared to those from non-elite neighborhood
presidents (columns (1) to (6)). Yet, these coefficients are for the most part not significant at standard
levels.
Given that elite status of the neighborhood president seems to be an important determinant of the
probability of successfully completing a pre-certification request, an important next question that arises is
to what extent the Chaskinet is able to reduce the observed gap in the probability of getting a request
successfully completed between local elites and non-elites. Coefficient β1, in Equation 3.2, measures this,
and it is reported at the end of each panel in Table 3.6. Overall, the Chaskinet is not able to significantly
reduce the gap in processing times between elite and non elites. Column (1) shows that interaction between
the Chaskinet and elite status resulted in a 6.3 percentage points reduction in the gap in processing times,
but this effect is only significant at the 10 percent level and in the baseline specification. The estimates in
all the other columns controlling for different levels of fixed effects show that these interactions are never
significant at standard levels. In contrast, the results on the number of public officials involved in processing
the requests are more encouraging and suggest that the Chaskinet reduced the gap in the number of public
officials involved in processing requests across the elite status of the neighborhood president. Columns (7) and
(8) show that interaction between the Chaskinet and the elite status of the president resulted in a reduction
between 1.7 and 2.4 percentage points in the gap in number of public officials across elite status, depending
on the specification, and this effect is always significant at the 5 percent level. Lastly, the estimates on
the probability of having a pre-certification request successfully completed suggest show that the Chaskinet
is unable to promote convergence in success gaps between elite and non elite neighborhood presidents. In
particular, none of the interactions between the Chaskinet and elite status of the neighborhood president
(columns (13) to (18)) are significant at standard levels.
Interpretation
A natural question that arises in this setting is why the Chaskinet is able to affect ping-pong practices and
number of days pre-certification requests take to get processed, but not the probability that a demand gets
successfully completed. To address this question, it might be useful to rethink the setting of the study and re-
examine the design of the experiment. The main objective of the Chaskinet was to facilitate the involvement
of neighborhood presidents in the process of reviewing, tracking, and monitoring pre-certification requests.
76
To do so, selected information generated by the Chaskinet was made publicly available to give the big picture
of the processing of these requests by type of project. This included summary statistics on composition of
requests, average number of requests (by type of infrastructure project), average processing times (by type
of infrastructure project), and number of public officials involved in the processing of request (by type
of infrastructure project).19 By providing transparent and accurate real-time information, the Chaskinet
significantly reduced the opportunity cost for neighborhood presidents to find out about the status of their
pre-certification requests. Yet, by making this information publicly available, the Chaskinet also implicitly
altered the probability that district council heads might detect inefficient practices among public officials
(i.e. ping-pong practices and unnecessary bureaucratic delay). To this end, the Chaskinet simultaneously
added an extra monitoring dimension into the study: top-down monitoring from district council heads to
public officials.
The effect of the Chaskinet on bureaucratic delay (including both ping-pong practices and number of
days requests take to get processed) might be the result of either the bottom-up or top-down monitoring
operating simultaneously in this setting. On the one hand, there is a large literature in labor economics
showing that monitoring tools tend to be highly effective at improving effort among workers (e.g. Grossman
and Hart (1983), Nalbantian and Schotter (1997), Mirrlees (1999), Nagin, Rebitzer, Sanders, and Taylor
(2002)). In the setting of this study, most public officials are appointed by the central government but local
authorities have lot of power over firing decisions if public officials are found to be incompetent in the job. By
explicitly altering the probability of detecting inefficient administrative practices, the Chaskinet implicitly
increased the expected cost of engaging in such practices among public officials. Therefore, the Chaskinet
created strong incentives for public officials to improve their performance as a result of the use that managers
(or head of district councils) might make of the information generated by the system. On the other hand, by
facilitating the involvement of neighborhood presidents in the process of monitoring project allocations, the
Chaskinet significantly reduced the opportunity cost for neighborhood presidents to engage in bottom-up
monitoring as a political investment. Consequently, the reduction in bureaucratic delay resulting from the
Chaskinet might respond either to neighborhood presidents becoming more engaged in the monitoring of
their pre-certification requests or the fear that heads of district councils would become more engaged in
the monitoring of their subordinates. Unfortunately, the design of the experiment does not allow me to
disentangle both mechanisms.
The one major objective of heads of district councils during their time in office is to keep support among
19In practice, heads of district councils and members of the oversight committees could unrestrictedly access all of the
Chaskinet information. Public officials and neighborhood presidents could only access the information if they performed
specific searches such as, for instance, tracking number, name of the neighborhood association, type of request, etc.
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neighborhood presidents for the next electoral period. This is normally achieved by repaying political support
to their peers through the use of favoritism when allocating small infrastructure projects. In contrast to
public officials, heads of district councils are not appointed by the central government but rather are local
leaders democratically elected among all neighborhood presidents in a district (by democratically elected, I
mean here that all presidents get to vote, but not that the local community as a whole is itself involved in
the voting process). The fact that the Chaskinet does not affect the probability of successfully completing
pre-certification requests, and that elites and successful endorsement of projects are positively correlated
suggest some scope for the existence of entrenched elites. To the extent that the Chaskinet significantly
increases the probability that members of the oversight committee might channel this information to the
central level, I would expect to observe at least some minimal changes in how small infrastructure projects
are endorsed if elites were not entrenched.
There are at least three explanations regarding why altering the probability that the exercise of discretion
might be detected does not change the allocation of small infrastructure projects by heads of district councils.
First, it might be that the members of the oversight committees did not fully realize the potential of the
information generated by the Chaskinet. Second, it might be that the members of the oversight committees
did not have enough time to incorporate the Chaskinet information into their oversight activities because
of the relatively short period of time of the intervention. Third, it might be that the members of the
oversight committees are not well aware of the elite groups at the district level and, therefore, are not able
to identify favoritism from the data generated by the Chaskinet. Certainly, all these are real possibilities
which unfortunately cannot be ruled out with the information at hand.
Limitations of the study
The main limitation of the study, as discussed above, is the power of the experiment given the clustered
randomization that took place in the study. An additional limitation is that the study does not allow me to
separate the effects of top-down monitoring (i.e. that coming from district councils heads to public officials)
from bottom-up monitoring (i.e. that coming directly from neighborhood presidents). On a different note,
it might also be interesting to mention that political constraints faced for the implementation of the project
were very real and that the program did not survive politically. After the completion of the implementation
of the project, municipal elections took place, and most local authorities were removed from office — turn
over rates are normally very high with an average time in office of over a year.20 At the present, it is in my
20Van Cott (2008) reports that, between 1995 and 1999, half the Bolivian population lived in municipalities whose district
councils’ heads had been replaced. Further, forty percent of municipalities changed their major every year during this four-year
period.
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understanding that in one only out of the four treated districts, the Chaskinet is still active and used as part
of the operational work. In the future, it might be interesting trying to implement a more complex version
of the experiment in other municipalities or evaluate the feasibility of randomizing similar interventions at
lower levels to get more statistical power. Certainly, however, the feasibility of an evaluation of such nature
would be contingent on the commitment and interest of public institutions in Bolivia to implement a project
of such nature.
Concluding remarks
Since the introduction of the decentralization and law of popular participation, the delivery of small infras-
tructure projects by municipal governments in Bolivia has witnessed a radical overhaul. The law drastically
empowered citizens by granting grassroots organizations the right to participate in the planning, budgeting,
and monitoring of these projects in representation of their communities. Further, the law granted them
veto power over municipal budgets to discipline providers, and to ensure that local elites did not capture a
disproportionate share of resources. Although the law was enacted more than a decade ago now, grassroots
organizations still seem to face important constraints in participating in the monitoring of small infrastruc-
ture projects allocations, including lack of adequate monitoring tools.
This paper investigates the potential of a monitoring tool designed to reduce bureaucratic delay within
the administrative processing of small infrastructure projects by municipal governments. Bolivia presents a
unique setting in which to study this question for several reasons. First, local leaders have strong political
incentives to get actively engaged in the monitoring of these projects. Second, the law of popular participa-
tion introduced in 1994 created formal, and by now well established, mechanisms to voice complaints and
discipline municipal providers. Third, there is a huge demand for small infrastructure projects at the local
level, and its delivery is something citizens greatly value.
The results from this paper suggest that the provision and dissemination of information might play a
crucial role in improving public service outcomes. I find that the monitoring tool used in this study signifi-
cantly reduced the amount of time projects require to get revised and endorsed by municipal governments.
Further, I find that this monitoring tool makes the administrative processing of these projects more effective
by reducing the number of public officials needed to get the revision of the project completed. However,
this monitoring tool is not successful at changing the allocation patterns of these projects, which seem to be
strongly biased toward grassroots organizations supporting local authorities. My results present evidence of
the value of making information widely available to beneficiaries (both to grassroots organizations and local
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public sector managers). Yet, it is not clear whether in my setting the observed effects are purely driven by
the engagement of grassroots organizations in the monitoring process or also by the use of the monitoring
information by public sector managers. Overall, my results suggest that monitoring tools would only work
up to the highest-level at which a real punishment to providers might be enforced.
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Chapter 3 Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: Photographs of district councils’ manual mailing tracking system, El
Alto, Bolivia, 2010
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Figure 3.2: Empirical distribution of the number of days demands take to get
processed, El Alto, Bolivia, 2010
Note: The empirical probability distribution function is estimated using an
Epanechnikov kernel. BW=5. The two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for
equality of distribution functions yields 0.2539 (p-value=0.000).
Figure 3.3: Empirical distribution of the number of public officials involved in
addressing request, El Alto, Bolivia, 2010
Note: The empirical probability distribution function is estimated using an
Epanechnikov kernel. BW=0.8. The two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for
equality of distribution functions yields 0.1864 (p-value=0.000).
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Table 3.1: Composition of small infrastructure projects delivered by district
councils (%), El Alto, Bolivia, 2010a
Proportion Linearized
standard error
(1) (2)
Ancillary projects 0.0184 (0.1345)
Tree planting and landscaping 0.0993 (0.2990)
Civil security and safety 0.1289 (0.3351)
Construction materials 0.0053 (0.0726)
Culverts 0.0030 (0.0546)
Ditch digging 0.1420 (0.3491)
Groundworks 0.0979 (0.2972)
Heavy machinery 0.0147 (0.1205)
Irrigation channels 0.1609 (0.3674)
Retaining walls 0.0023 (0.0479)
Road refurbishments 0.0035 (0.0587)
Road surface paving 0.0711 (0.2569)
Sewage treatment 0.0089 (0.0938)
Shallow excavations 0.0167 (0.1281)
Street lighting 0.0422 (0.2009)
Street lighting maintenance 0.0020 (0.0442)
Trench digging 0.0116 (0.1072)
Boundary wall 0.0068 (0.0822)
Water systems 0.1647 (0.3709)
Observations 7,379
a
The small infrastructure projects reported in this table correspond only
to those included in our final sample. Standard errors were calculated
using a Taylor Series linearization approach allowing for clustering at
the pair level.
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Table 3.2: Number of neighborhood associations by Chaskinet status, El
Alto, Bolivia, 2010a
Number of neighborhood Matched-pair Control Chaskinet Total
associations (1) (2) (3) (4)
Total number actively engaged in pre-certification requests 1 51 60 111
Total number in district 1 80 87 167
Total number actively engaged in pre-certification requests 2 80 69 149
Total number in district 2 92 82 174
Total number actively engaged in pre-certification requests 3 27 26 53
Total number in district 3 32 31 63
Total number actively engaged in pre-certification requests 4 49 44 93
Total number in district 4 91 112 203
Total number actively engaged - 207 199 406
Total number - 295 312 607
a
Tabulations are taken from results of the randomization and from administrative data. This is a self-weighting sample in
which each district council faced a 50 percent probability chance of being randomized into the Chaskinet treatment within
each matched-pair.
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Table 3.3: Relationship between Chaskinet, district council, and neighbor-
hood association characteristics, El Alto, Bolivia, 2010a
Chaskinet Chaskinet Chaskinet
(1) (2) (3)
Neighborhood association population size 0.0000 0.0000*
(0.000) (0.000)
Neighborhood association quality of life index -0.0107 -0.0083
(0.008) (0.004)
Neighborhood association literacy rate -0.1241 -0.0125
(0.081) (0.011)
Neighborhood association unemployment rate 0.0033 -0.0045
(0.008) (0.002)
Neighborhood association access to electricity rate 0.0070*** 0.0002
(0.001) (0.001)
Neighborhood association access to sanitary toilet facilities rate 0.0038 -0.0003
(0.003) (0.001)
Neighborhood association access to landline phone rate 0.0015 0.0030
(0.008) (0.001)
Neighborhood association poverty rate -0.0001 -0.0003
(0.002) (0.000)
Neighborhood association president ever attended college indicator 0.1032 0.0441
(0.054) (0.031)
Neighborhood association president average time on duty 0.0981 0.0242
(0.061) (0.021)
Neighborhood association president is female indicator 0.1127 0.0101
(0.107) (0.024)
Number of public officials working at the district council -0.2535 -0.1867
(0.199) (0.223)
Share of public officials that ever attended college 0.1036 0.1288
(0.183) (0.058)
Public officials’ average time on duty -0.0186 -0.2077
(0.556) (0.217)
Share of public officials that are female 0.0005 0.0101
(0.017) (0.006)
Share of public officials that are staff -0.0016 0.0003
(0.006) (0.002)
Observations 607 8 607
p-value of all listed variables 0.210 0.174 0.096
a
Estimates reported are marginal effects from probit regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses adjusted for
clustering at the matched-pair level.
*** Significant at 1 percent level.
** Significant at 5 percent level.
* Significant at 10 percent level.
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Table 3.6: Chaskinet, local elites, and bureaucratic delay outcomes, El Alto,
Bolivia, 2010†
TYPE OF REQUEST TYPE OF REQUEST MATCHED-PAIR
FIXED EFFECTS NOT CONTROLLED FOR FIXED EFFECTS
βˆ p-value βˆ p-value βˆ p-value
PROCESSING TIME IN DAYS (LOGS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Chaskinet -0.181 -0.182 -0.1434
Standard errors not clustered (0.020)*** 0.000 (0.020)*** 0.000 (0.020)*** 0.000
Standard errors clustered at NA level (0.068)*** 0.008 (0.076)** 0.018 (0.078)* 0.068
Elite neighborhood association -0.042 -0.044 -0.028
Standard errors not clustered (0.025)* 0.093 (0.025)* 0.084 (0.024) 0.241
Standard errors clustered at NA level (0.095) 0.658 (0.108) 0.687 (0.071) 0.692
Chaskinet*Elite 0.063 0.042 -0.017
Standard errors not clustered (0.037)* 0.087 (0.037) 0.261 (0.036) 0.632
Standard errors clustered at NA level (0.123) 0.612 (0.144) 0.771 (0.139) 0.900
Mean dependent variable 3.016 - 3.016 - 3.016 -
NUMBER OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS (LOGS)
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Chaskinet -0.084 -0.087 -0.088
Standard errors not clustered (0.003)*** 0.000 (0.003)*** 0.000 (0.003)*** 0.000
Standard errors clustered at NA level (0.013)*** 0.000 (0.015)*** 0.000 (0.013)*** 0.000
Elite neighborhood association -0.020 -0.020 -0.006
Standard errors not clustered (0.005)*** 0.000 (0.006)*** 0.000 (0.005) 0.197
Standard errors clustered at NA level (0.032) 0.538 (0.037) 0.590 (0.023) 0.797
Chaskinet*Elite 0.024 0.017 -0.009
Standard errors not clustered (0.006)** 0.000 (0.007)** 0.010 (0.006) 0.152
Standard errors clustered at NA level (0.033) 0.459 (0.039) 0.667 (0.032) 0.783
Mean dependent variable 1.910 - 1.910 - 1.910 -
PRE-CERTIFICATION PROCESS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Chaskinet -0.018 -0.004 -0.001
Standard errors not clustered (0.011)* (0.098) (0.010) 0.701 (0.010) 0.926
Standard errors clustered at NA level (0.028) 0.524 (0.025) 0.873 (0.027) 0.971
Elite neighborhood association 0.190 0.186 0.192
Standard errors not clustered (0.016)*** 0.000 (0.017)*** 0.000 (0.0170)*** 0.000
Standard errors clustered at NA level (0.033)*** 0.000 (0.037)*** 0.000 (0.032)*** 0.000
Chaskinet*Elite 0.011 0.001 -0.012
Standard errors not clustered (0.023) 0.632 (0.023) 0.978 (0.023) 0.605
Standard errors clustered at NA level (0.048) 0.821 (0.052) 0.990 (0.054) 0.822
Mean dependent variable 0.220 - 0.220 - 0.220 -
Observations 7,379 - 7,379 - 7,379 -
†
Each Chaskinet effect, standard error, and accompanying p-value is taken from a separate OLS regression based in Equation
3.1. Each row shows a different dependent variable, shown at the left. Robust standard errors of the Chaskinet effects are in
parenthesis not allowing for clustering and allowing for clustering by neighborhood association, as shown at the left. All
p-values for Chaskinet effects computed using permutation inference as described in Appendix 3. *** Significant at 1
percent level. ** Significant at 5 percent level. * Significant at 10 percent level.
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Chapter 3 Appendix: Significance testing using permutation tests
The classical exposition of permutation tests for hypothesis testing and, more generally, of permutation
inference is presented in Fisher (1935).† Despite its popularity in the analysis of clinical trials, its use in
economics is relatively new. Permutation tests are significance tests based on permutation samples drawn at
random from the data in a way that is consistent with the study design. Permutation sampling is performed
by assigning the full set of observed outcomes at random to both treatment and control groups under the
null hypothesis that the treatment has no effect on the outcome of interest. To this end, permutation tests
do not require a model of outcomes but rather a model of assignment. The permutation samples are then
employed to build a permutation distribution, which is used to test for whether the size of the treatment
effect of interest is occurring “just by chance”.
The general procedure for a permutation test is as follows. First, one computes the statistic that measures
the size of the treatment effect of interest under the original data. Second, one pools the observations of
the treatment and control groups and randomly draws permutation samples. Third, one constructs the
permutation distribution of the statistic by using each of the randomly selected permutation sample. Lastly,
one computes the p-value of the statistic by locating the original statistic on the permutation distribution.
A value in the main body of the distribution could easily be occurring just by chance. A value in the
tail, however, would rarely occur just by chance and presents evidence that something other than chance
is underlying the data generation process. In this sense, permutation tests partially protect us from low
power. Yet, when the true treatment effect is large, this technique has low power relative to more parametric
approaches because it does not put even a minimal structure on the error term (Kremer, Bloom, Bhushan,
Clingingsmith, Hung, King, Loevinsohn, and Schwartz, 2006).
To illustrate how I use permutation tests in my setting to compute the p-value of the t-statistic of the
difference in means between Chaskinet and control groups, consider for instance the case of the p-values
reported in column (3) of Table 3.5. The domain of both distributions is
(
8
4
)
= 8!/(4!)2 = 70 (i.e. there
are 70 possible ways of dividing the 8 district councils into 2 treatment groups of 4 district councils each).‡
As the number of clusters is small, I perform exact permutation tests (i.e. I calculate the values of the
t-test statistic under all these possible permutations of the treatment status). The set of these calculated
statistics are used to estimate two separate permutation distributions for each of the two outcomes of interest
†Rosenberger and Lachin (2002) present an up-to-date comprehensive exposition of permutation inference in clinical trials.
Permutation tests are also called randomization tests or re-randomization tests.
‡When blocking is explicitly taken into consideration, the domain of the distribution is
4∏
s=1
(2
1
)
s
= 24 = 16 (i.e. there
are 16 possible ways of dividing the 8 district councils into 4 pairs, each with one and only one treated unit). To this extent,
therefore, the blocking into pairs makes the procedure a bit simpler, but also less powerful to detect treatment effects.
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under the null that the Chaskinet does not have any effect on these outcomes. Given these lists of possible
realizations, I now calculate the probability of the observed difference in means in the standard way (i.e.
by locating it in the distribution and taking into consideration the fact that, under the null, each of the
realizations has an equal chance of 1/70 of being selected).
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